IN RE: Jacob ALPERT (2018)

Order and judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered August 12, 2016, which granted the petition to confirm an arbitration award, denied respondents' cross petition to vacate the award, and awarded judgment in favor of petitioner in the total sum of $642,153.52, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The arbitration award was not in manifest disregard of the law, based on petitioner's undisputed claim, amended claim, and testimony that he was promised bonuses in 2011 and 2012, which he did not receive (Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, 304 A.D.2d 103, 108, 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 [1st Dept. 2003] ).  “[T]o the extent the FAA permits vacatur of an arbitration award on the ground that it is irrational” (Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Afridi, 13 A.D.3d 248, 250, 788 N.Y.S.2d 11 [1st Dept. 2004] ), the motion court correctly found that respondents, at best, demonstrated disagreement with the award, which was not a basis to conclude the award was irrational.

Respondents' contention that any promise to pay a bonus was an unenforceable agreement to agree is unpreserved and unavailing.  In any event, “[a]n arbitrator's paramount responsibility is to reach an equitable result” (Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 N.Y.2d 623, 629, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 389 N.E.2d 456 [1979] ).  The elements of a claim for unjust enrichment are that plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendant, and the defendant obtained such benefit without adequately compensating plaintiff (see Nakamura v. Fujii, 253 A.D.2d 387, 390, 677 N.Y.S.2d 113 [1st Dept. 1998] ).  These elements were met, based on petitioner's undisputed claim that he rebuilt a municipal bond department “decimated” by the 2008 financial crisis, and that he brought significant new clients to the firm, for which he received no incentive compensation in 2011 and 2012.

The arbitration panel's finding that respondents were jointly and severally liable for petitioner's bonuses pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law §§ 273 and 276 was not in manifest disregard of the law or irrational based either on the individual respondent's 100% ownership of M.R. Beal as a limited partner or his ownership of the general partner corporation (see Gonzalez v. Chalpin, 77 N.Y.2d 74, 77, 564 N.Y.S.2d 702, 565 N.E.2d 1253 [1990];  D'Mel & Assoc. v. Athco, Inc., 105 A.D.3d 451, 452, 963 N.Y.S.2d 65 [1st Dept. 2013] ).  Nor was it irrational to find that the Debtor and Creditor Law was applicable, based on petitioner's claim that there was ample money in the firm to pay his promised compensation, notwithstanding transfers of assets made by the individual respondent.