PEOPLE v. ZANDERS (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a nonjury verdict of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]), defendant contends that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence inasmuch as his statements to the police were involuntary and should have been disregarded by County Court, and the record lacked credible evidence that he had the intent to cause serious physical injury. Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime in this nonjury trial (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007]), we reject that contention (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987]). First, the People established beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntariness of defendant's statements, and thus it cannot be said that the court, which relied on and accepted those statements, rendered a verdict that is contrary to the weight of the evidence (see People v. Scippio, 144 A.D.3d 1184, 1186-1187, 41 N.Y.S.3d 563 [3d Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1150, 52 N.Y.S.3d 302, 74 N.E.3d 687 [2017]; People v. Vieou, 107 A.D.3d 1052, 1053-1054, 966 N.Y.S.2d 284 [3d Dept. 2013]; see also People v. Lewis, 140 A.D.3d 1593, 1594-1595, 34 N.Y.S.3d 806 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1029, 45 N.Y.S.3d 380, 68 N.E.3d 109 [2016]). Second, the People established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was liable as an accessory (see generally People v. Molson, 89 A.D.3d 1539, 1540, 933 N.Y.S.2d 160 [4th Dept. 2011], lv denied 18 N.Y.3d 960, 944 N.Y.S.2d 489, 967 N.E.2d 714 [2012]; People v. Alexander, 51 A.D.3d 1380, 1383, 857 N.Y.S.2d 418 [4th Dept. 2008], lv denied 11 N.Y.3d 733, 864 N.Y.S.2d 392, 894 N.E.2d 656 [2008]). “ ‘Accessorial liability requires only that defendant, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission of the crime[ ], intentionally aid another in the conduct constituting the offense[ ]’ ” (People v. Williams, 179 A.D.3d 1502, 1502, 118 N.Y.S.3d 847 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 995, 125 N.Y.S.3d 635, 149 N.E.3d 396 [2020]; see § 20.00; People v. Nafi, 132 A.D.3d 1301, 1302, 18 N.Y.S.3d 233 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1147, 32 N.Y.S.3d 61, 51 N.E.3d 572 [2016]). Here, defendant's statements to the police and the testimony at trial established that defendant knew that the man who shot the victim had a firearm, defendant provided transportation for the shooter to the scene of the shooting, he gave the man a hoody to conceal the weapon, he knew that the man was probably going to shoot someone, and he acted as a lookout for the police for the man. Defendant had a “community of purpose” with (People v. Scott, 25 N.Y.3d 1107, 14 N.Y.S.3d 308, 1110, 35 N.E.3d 476 [2015]) and “ ‘shared in the intention of’ ” the shooter (Williams, 179 A.D.3d at 1503, 118 N.Y.S.3d 847; see Molson, 89 A.D.3d at 1540, 933 N.Y.S.2d 160).

Contrary to defendant's further contention, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.