Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
IN RE: JEFFREY A. THOMPSON, PETITIONER–APPELLANT -RESPONDENT, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF JOHN P. BURNS AND COUNTY OF JEFFERSON, RESPONDENTS–RESPONDENTS -APPELLANTS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Appeal and cross appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, Jefferson County (Hugh A. Gilbert, J.), entered December 21, 2012 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. The judgment, among other things, granted the petition in part.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by confirming the determination in its entirety and dismissing the petition and as modified the judgment is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the determination, made after an advisory arbitration hearing, suspending him for 45 days without pay from his employment as a correction officer in the Sheriff's Office of respondent County of Jefferson based on his violation of three departmental rules and regulations. Supreme Court confirmed the determination with respect to charge one, which alleged that petitioner had violated section 4.2 of the Sheriff's Department's Unified Code of Conduct (Conduct Unbecoming Members and Employees), and charge two, which alleged that he had violated section 4.3 of the Code of Conduct (Consorting with Persons of Ill Repute). The court granted that part of the petition seeking to vacate the finding of guilt with respect to charge three, which alleged that petitioner violated section 4.12 of the Code of Conduct (Membership and Organizations), and remitted the matter to respondents “to determine whether the penalty should be adjusted as a result.” We conclude that the determination should be confirmed in its entirety and that the petition should be dismissed, and we therefore modify the judgment accordingly.
Initially, we agree with respondents that the proper standard of review is whether there is a rational basis for the determination or whether it is arbitrary and capricious, and not whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Fortune v State of N.Y., Div. of State Police, 293 A.D.2d 154, 157; Matter of Pierino v. Brown, 281 A.D.2d 960, 960; Matter of Marin v. Benson, 131 A.D.2d 100, 103; see generally Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231). Here, the hearing was mandated by a collective bargaining agreement and not required by statute or law, thereby making the former standard the appropriate standard of judicial review (see CPLR 7803[4]; Matter of Colton v. Berman, 21 N.Y.2d 322, 329; Pierino, 261 A.D.2d at 960). Contrary to respondents' contention, however, we conclude that both the determination of guilt and the penalty imposed are subject to judicial review (cf. Antinore v. State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 6, 8, affd 40 N.Y.2d 921; see generally Matter of Plainedge Fedn. of Teachers v Plainedge Union Free Sch. Dist., 58 N.Y.2d 902, 903–904).
With respect to the merits, “[a]n action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts” (Matter of Peckham v. Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431). An agency's determination “is entitled to great deference” (Matter of Walker v State Univ. of N.Y. [Upstate Med. Univ.], 19 AD3d 1058, 1059, lv denied 5 NY3d 713 [internal quotation marks omitted] ) and, “[i]f the [reviewing] court finds that the determination is supported by a rational basis, it must sustain the determination even if the court concludes that it would have reached a different result than the one reached by the agency” (Peckham, 12 NY3d at 431; see Matter of Diocese of Rochester v Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 520). Moreover, it is well settled that law enforcement officers may be “held to higher standards than ordinary civil service employees” (Matter of Batista v. Kelly, 16 AD3d 182, 182), and that “an administrative determination regarding discipline will be afforded heightened deference where a law enforcement agency ․ is concerned” (Fortune, 293 A.D.2d at 157; see Trotta v. Ward, 77 N.Y.2d 827, 828, rearg dismissed 79 N.Y.2d 887).
With respect to charge two, for consorting with persons of ill repute, the jail administrator testified that he considered any member of Hells Angels to be “a person of ill repute, regardless of the person's criminal history, because the organization itself has close ties to organized crime.” A detective who was involved in police surveillance of the event testified that he observed Hells Angels members at the event, and that he recognized another attendee as “a person known in the area to be associated with Hells Angels” and who has a criminal history. In any event, even if petitioner did not in fact “consort” with a person of ill repute at the event, we conclude that there is a rational basis for the determination that a Hells Angels-sponsored event is a place where “persons of questionable character” would be likely to congregate within the meaning of section 4.3 of the Code of Conduct.
As for charge three, concerning membership and organizations, although it is undisputed that the motorcycle club to which petitioner belongs is not affiliated with Hells Angels, we conclude that there is a rational basis for the determination that petitioner's attendance at an official Hells Angels-sponsored event constituted a “knowing[ ] ․ connect[ion]” with a “subversive organization,” i.e., “an[ ] organization ․ whose object or purpose, either directly or indirectly, would adversely affect the discipline or conduct of the members/employees” in violation of section 4.12 of the Code of Conduct.
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court
A free source of state and federal court opinions, state laws, and the United States Code. For more information about the legal concepts addressed by these cases and statutes visit FindLaw's Learn About the Law.
Docket No: CA 13–01873
Decided: June 13, 2014
Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)