IN RE: MYA B. (2011)

 Respondent father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect and transferring guardianship and custody of the child to petitioner.   We reject the father's contention that petitioner failed to establish that it had exercised diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parent-child relationship during his incarceration as required by Social Services Law § 384–b(7)(a).  “Diligent efforts include reasonable attempts at providing counseling, scheduling regular visitation with the child, providing services to the parent[ ] to overcome problems that prevent the discharge of the child into [his or her] care, and informing the parent[ ] of [the] child's progress” (Matter of Jessica Lynn W., 244 A.D.2d 900, 900–901, 665 N.Y.S.2d 205;  see § 384–b[7][f] ).  Petitioner is not required, however, to “guarantee that the parent succeed in overcoming his or her predicaments” (matter of sheila g., 61 n.y.2D 368, 385, 474 n.y.s.2D 421, 462 N.E.2d 1139;  see Matter of Jamie M., 63 N.Y.2d 388, 393, 482 N.Y.S.2d 461, 472 N.E.2d 311) but, rather, the parent must “assume a measure of initiative and responsibility” (Jamie M., 63 N.Y.2d at 393, 482 N.Y.S.2d 461, 472 N.E.2d 311).   Here, petitioner established by the requisite clear and convincing evidence that it fulfilled its duty to exercise diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the father's relationship with his child during the relevant time period (see § 384–b[3][g][i];  [7][a];  see generally Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136, 142, 481 N.Y.S.2d 26, 470 N.E.2d 824).

 Contrary to the father's further contention, Family Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to enter a suspended judgment.   The record supports the court's determination that a suspended judgment, i.e., “a brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with the child” (Matter of Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 311, 590 N.Y.S.2d 60, 604 N.E.2d 122), was not in the child's best interests (see Matter of Shadazia W., 52 A.D.3d 1330, 860 N.Y.S.2d 721, lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 706, 866 N.Y.S.2d 610, 896 N.E.2d 96;  Matter of Da'Nasjeion T., 32 A.D.3d 1242, 820 N.Y.S.2d 910).   Finally, “[t]he father did not ask the court to consider post-termination contact with the child[ ] ․ or to conduct a hearing on that issue, and we conclude in any event that [he] failed to establish that such contact would be in the best interests of the child[ ]” (Matter of Christopher J., 63 A.D.3d 1662, 880 N.Y.S.2d 405, lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 706, 2009 WL 2998150 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Diana M.T., 57 A.D.3d 1492, 870 N.Y.S.2d 656, lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 708, 881 N.Y.S.2d 17, 908 N.E.2d 925).

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: