PEOPLE v. POLITE (2007)

Order (Lawrence H. Bernstein, J.), entered on or about December 2, 2005, reversed, on the law and the facts, motion denied, accusatory instrument reinstated, and matter remitted for further proceedings.

 The sole charge now remaining for prosecution on the within accusatory instrument is driving while impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[1] ), a traffic infraction which, as defendant now concedes, triggers no statutory speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30 (see People v. Gonzalez, 168 Misc.2d 136, 137, 645 N.Y.S.2d 978 [1996], lv. denied 88 N.Y.2d 936, 647 N.Y.S.2d 170, 670 N.E.2d 454 [1996] ).   Nor did the allegations set forth in defendant's supplemental motion papers establish a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial (see People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303 [1975] ).   Although the 18-month delay involved was not insubstantial, the record indicates that much of the delay was justified, caused in large part by defendant's motion practice or court congestion, and that relatively little delay was attributable to the People (see People v. Marino, 6 A.D.3d 214, 775 N.Y.S.2d 20 [2004], lv. denied 3 N.Y.3d 643, 782 N.Y.S.2d 415, 816 N.E.2d 205 [2004];  People v. Newton, 221 A.D.2d 167, 632 N.Y.S.2d 962 [1995], lv. denied 87 N.Y.2d 923, 641 N.Y.S.2d 605, 664 N.E.2d 516 [1996];  cf. People v. Staley, 41 N.Y.2d 789, 790, 396 N.Y.S.2d 339, 364 N.E.2d 1111 [involving “wholly unexplained 31-month delay”] ).   Moreover, defendant was not incarcerated and made no showing that his ability to defend was prejudiced by the delay (see People v. Williams, 284 A.D.2d 221, 726 N.Y.S.2d 269 [2001], lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 926, 732 N.Y.S.2d 643, 758 N.E.2d 669 [2001] ).

 In evaluating a defendant's constitutional speedy trial claim, a court “must engage in a sensitive weighing process of the diversified factors present in the particular case” (People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d at 445, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303), with “no one factor or combination of ․ factors ․ necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim” (id.).   To the extent that trial-level decisions in such cases as People v. Fisher, 167 Misc.2d 850, 635 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1995) and People v. Mahmood, 10 Misc.3d 198, 800 N.Y.S.2d 919 (2005) appear to apply a narrower standard of constitutional speedy trial review to traffic violation prosecutions of the type here involved, they are inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' teaching in Taranovich and are otherwise unpersuasive.

PER CURIAM.