RING III v. BRISTOL BUILDERS INC (2000)

 This action was commenced to recover damages for injuries sustained by Dean M. Wilkins while working on the construction of an addition at the residence of Jennifer Sands and Richard Sands (third-party defendants).   The accident occurred when Wilkins backed into an unprotected opening in the second floor hallway and fell to the first floor.   Supreme Court properly granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on Labor Law § 240(1) liability and denied that part of defendant's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing that claim.   We reject defendant's contention that Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply to Wilkins' fall (see, Becerra v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 188, 190, 690 N.Y.S.2d 52;  Nowak v. Kiefer, 256 A.D.2d 1129, 685 N.Y.S.2d 151, lv. dismissed in part and denied in part 93 N.Y.2d 887, 689 N.Y.S.2d 428, 711 N.E.2d 642, rearg. dismissed 93 N.Y.2d 1000, 695 N.Y.S.2d 746, 717 N.E.2d 1083;  Negroni v. East 67th St. Owners, 249 A.D.2d 79, 80, 671 N.Y.S.2d 464).   Plaintiff established as a matter of law that the violation of Labor Law § 240(1) was the proximate cause of the accident (see, Felker v. Corning Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 219, 225, 660 N.Y.S.2d 349, 682 N.E.2d 950) and that defendant is liable for that violation as the general contractor on the project (see, Dennis v. Beltrone Constr. Co., 195 A.D.2d 688, 689, 599 N.Y.S.2d 723;  Kenny v. George A. Fuller Co., 87 A.D.2d 183, 186-189, 450 N.Y.S.2d 551, lv. denied 58 N.Y.2d 603, 459 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 445 N.E.2d 218).   Defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact.   The court properly denied that part of defendant's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim (see, Frank v. Meadowlakes Dev. Corp., 256 A.D.2d 1141, 1142, 686 N.Y.S.2d 540;  Riley v. Stickl Constr. Co., 242 A.D.2d 936, 662 N.Y.S.2d 660;  Mazzu v. Benderson Dev. Co., 224 A.D.2d 1009, 1011, 637 N.Y.S.2d 540) and the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims (see, Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 506, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d 82;  Houde v. Barton, 202 A.D.2d 890, 891-892, 609 N.Y.S.2d 411, lv. dismissed 84 N.Y.2d 977, 622 N.Y.S.2d 916, 647 N.E.2d 122).

 The court also properly granted that part of the motion of third-party defendants seeking summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.   Third-party defendants established as a matter of law that they are entitled to the homeowner's exemption under Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6) (see, Slettene v. Ginsburg, 257 A.D.2d 656, 657, 684 N.Y.S.2d 296;  Lane v. Karian, 210 A.D.2d 549, 549-550, 619 N.Y.S.2d 796) and that they are not liable for common-law negligence or violation of Labor Law § 200 (see, Beckford v. Canessa, 205 A.D.2d 655, 656, 613 N.Y.S.2d 659).   Defendant-third-party plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.   Finally, the court properly granted that part of the motion of third-party defendants seeking summary judgment on their counterclaim for contractual indemnification.   Absent a showing of negligence on the part of third-party defendants, the indemnification agreement is enforceable (see, Itri Brick & Concrete Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 786, 795, n. 5, 658 N.Y.S.2d 903, 680 N.E.2d 1200, rearg. denied 90 N.Y.2d 1008, 666 N.Y.S.2d 103, 688 N.E.2d 1385;  Velez v. Tishman Foley Partners, 245 A.D.2d 155, 157, 666 N.Y.S.2d 591;  Connolly v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 168 A.D.2d 477, 478, 562 N.Y.S.2d 718, lv. denied 78 N.Y.2d 864, 578 N.Y.S.2d 879, 586 N.E.2d 62).

Order unanimously affirmed with costs.

MEMORANDUM: