PEOPLE v. BELTRE PINEDA (1997)

 County Court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30.   Because the People declared their readiness seven days before the expiration of the six-month period, it was possible for the court to arraign defendant within the statutory period.   Thus, the People's announcement of readiness was not invalid because it preceded defendant's arraignment (see, People v. Goss, 87 N.Y.2d 792, 797, 642 N.Y.S.2d 607, 665 N.E.2d 177;  People v. Kitchen, 234 A.D.2d 964, 653 N.Y.S.2d 50, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 1095, 660 N.Y.S.2d 389, 682 N.E.2d 990;  People v. Price, 234 A.D.2d 973, 651 N.Y.S.2d 815;  People v. Clarke, 233 A.D.2d 831, 649 N.Y.S.2d 568, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 1010, 658 N.Y.S.2d 248, 680 N.E.2d 622, 90 N.Y.2d 856, 661 N.Y.S.2d 183, 683 N.E.2d 1057).   The ensuing delay in executing the bench warrant issued upon defendant's failure to appear for arraignment is not chargeable to the People.   Postreadiness delay is chargeable to the People only if “it is the People's dereliction that [prevents] the defendant's trial from going forward” (People v. McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d 59, 64, 556 N.Y.S.2d 514, 555 N.E.2d 911).  “Arraigning a defendant upon an indictment is exclusively a court function” (People v. Goss, supra, at 797, 642 N.Y.S.2d 607, 665 N.E.2d 177).   Thus, any delay in arraignment was attributable solely to the court and is not chargeable to the People (see, People v. Goss, supra, at 798, 642 N.Y.S.2d 607, 665 N.E.2d 177;  see also, People v. Williams, 229 A.D.2d 603, 646 N.Y.S.2d 142, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 931, 654 N.Y.S.2d 734, 677 N.E.2d 306;  People v. Myers, 171 A.D.2d 148, 575 N.Y.S.2d 152, lv. denied 79 N.Y.2d 922, 582 N.Y.S.2d 82, 590 N.E.2d 1210).

Order unanimously reversed on the law, motion denied, indictment reinstated and matter remitted to Onondaga County Court for further proceedings on the indictment.

MEMORANDUM: