BALDWIN v. WILKINS (2004)

 Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries he sustained when the vehicle he was driving, which was stopped at an intersection, was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by defendant Daniel R. Wilkins and owned by defendant Marylou Lynch.   Supreme Court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  “A rear-end collision into a stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of liability with respect to the operation of the moving vehicle” (Schuster v. Amboy Bus Co., 267 A.D.2d 448, 448, 700 N.Y.S.2d 484;  see Ruzycki v. Baker, 301 A.D.2d 48, 49, 750 N.Y.S.2d 680).   We agree with plaintiff that defendants failed to establish as a matter of law that the accident was the result of unanticipated brake failure (see Hubert v. Tripaldi, 307 A.D.2d 692, 694, 763 N.Y.S.2d 165).   The evidence submitted by defendants fails to establish either defendants' “previous inspection of the brakes or the cause of their failure” (Manny v. Casale, 15 A.D.2d 857, 857, 224 N.Y.S.2d 291;  see Wheeler v. Rabine, 15 A.D.2d 407, 408, 224 N.Y.S.2d 483).   Thus, defendants failed to establish the defense of unanticipated brake failure “sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in [their] favor” (CPLR 3212[b] ).

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law with costs, the motion is denied and the complaint is reinstated.

MEMORANDUM: