RYAN v. USA (2004)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton Tingling, J.), entered October 15, 2003, which, inter alia, denied defendant-appellant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims against it, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The motion court correctly found that defendant-appellant Key Bank is an owner of the car involved in the subject accident for purposes of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388.   When defendant-respondent driver leased the car, the lease was immediately assigned to Key Bank, which assumed the original lessor's “right and interest in the within Lease, [and] the Vehicle.” Further, the certificate of title is in the bank's name.   Since Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, “simply says ‘every owner’ shall be liable for injuries * * * resulting from the negligence of any person using the vehicle with the permission of such owner” (see Hassan v. Montuori, 99 N.Y.2d 348, 353, 756 N.Y.S.2d 126, 786 N.E.2d 25), appellant bank is an “owner” under that statute, regardless of its additional status as a secured creditor in the context of the lease transaction.   If the bank had retained no more than a security interest in the car, it would not be an “owner” within the statutory definition (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388[3] ), but plainly the bank, as assignee of the original lessor, retained a significantly greater property interest in the vehicle and was thus properly deemed an “owner” under the statute.

We have considered defendant-appellant's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.