PEOPLE v. AQUINO (2004)

Order dated September 19, 2003 (Larry R.C. Stephen, J.) reversed, on the law, motion denied, information reinstated, and matter remitted to Criminal Court for further proceedings.

Defendant's CPL 30.30 motion should have been denied.   The People's postreadiness delay in complying with their discovery obligations “had no bearing on the People's readiness” (People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529, 543, 498 N.Y.S.2d 119, 488 N.E.2d 1231 [1985] ), since the videotape belatedly produced by the People was not the subject of the defendant's suppression motion and did not impact upon the People's ability to proceed meaningfully at the scheduled suppression hearing (cf. People v. Simpkins, 193 Misc.2d 447, 748 N.Y.S.2d 445 [2002], lv. denied 99 N.Y.2d 585, 755 N.Y.S.2d 721, 785 N.E.2d 743 [2003] ).   In these circumstances, “preclusion rather than dismissal under CPL 30.30 would have been the proper corrective.”  (People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d at 542, 498 N.Y.S.2d 119, 488 N.E.2d 1231.)   Our decision reduces the amount of delay chargeable to the People to a maximum of 67 days, which is within the 90-day statutory limit (see CPL 30.30[1][b] ).

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

PER CURIAM.