IN RE: L.R. (2026)

Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Ronna H. Gordon–Galchus, J.), entered on or about October 21, 2024, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, after a hearing, upon a determination that respondent J.T. abused the subject child K.T. and derivatively abused the subject children R.R. and L.R., directed respondent to comply with an order of protection enjoining him to stay away from R.R. and L.R. until their respective eighteenth birthdays, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

J.T.'s argument that Family Court Act § 1056(4) is inapplicable is unpreserved for appellate review.  Family Court Act § 1056(4) permits the court to issue an independent order of protection lasting until a child's eighteenth birthday against a person “who was a member of the child's household or a person legally responsible ․, and who is no longer a member of such household at the time of the disposition and who is not related by blood or marriage to the child or a member of the child's household.”  The record shows that, during summation, respondent expressly conceded that the provision applied and that the court could enter an order of protection to last until the children's eighteenth birthdays.  In any event, respondent testified that he had not resided with the mother and the children since the earlier order of protection had been issued.

Family Court also providently exercised its discretion in directing J.T. to stay away from R.R. and L.R. until their respective eighteenth birthdays (see Matter of N.V. [Bethsaida C.], 203 AD3d 529, 530 [1st Dept 2022] ).  At the time of the order of disposition, respondent had consented to a finding of neglect pursuant to Family Court Act § 1051(a) without admitting the allegation, but he had taken no responsibility for his conduct and repeatedly refused to attend a sex offender program or any alternative service.  The record further demonstrates that respondent violated an existing order of protection, as shown by the video in evidence, and invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege when questioned about his contact with the children.  Contrary to respondent's contention that L.R. was differently situated from K.T., respondent was a person legally responsible for all three children, and L.R. is currently the same age K.T. was when J.T. abused K.T.. In light of J.T.'s refusal to comply with court-ordered services and his violation of prior orders, Family Court reasonably concluded that a long-term order of protection was necessary to protect R.R. and L.R.

We have considered respondent's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.