IN RE: CASHEENA WILLIAMS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed.

Memorandum: In this CPLR article 78 proceeding transferred to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g), petitioner seeks, inter alia, to annul a determination following a fair hearing finding that she committed an intentional program violation of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) by failing to report her daughter's employment income when she applied for recertification, which resulted in petitioner receiving an overissuance of SNAP benefits and disqualified her from receiving SNAP benefits for twelve months. We confirm the determination.

“[T]he role of a court reviewing an administrative determination is limited to ensuring that the determination arrived at following an adversarial hearing is supported by substantial evidence” (Matter of Bello v New York State Off. of Temporary & Disability Assistance, 90 AD3d 1706, 1706 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 810 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 7803 [4]; Faber v Merrifield, 11 AD3d 1009, 1010 [4th Dept 2004]), and not, as petitioner contends, by clear and convincing evidence. Substantial evidence is “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180 [1978]). We conclude that the determination that petitioner intentionally failed to disclose her daughter's income is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Smith v Wing, 1 AD3d 933, 934 [4th Dept 2003]; Matter of Williams v Perales, 156 AD2d 697, 698 [2d Dept 1989]). It was established at the administrative hearing that petitioner, knowing that she was required to disclose the income of everyone living with her, disclosed her own income but not the income of her daughter and, contrary to petitioner's contention, it is “readily inferable therefrom that she acted intentionally” (Smith, 1 AD3d at 934). Additionally, although respondent was presented with conflicting evidence with respect to whether the daughter's income was disclosed, “[i]t is for the administrative tribunal, not the courts, to weigh conflicting evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and determine which [evidence] to accept and which to reject ․ This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of respondent” in rejecting petitioner's position that her daughter's income was disclosed (Bello, 90 AD3d at 1707 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Smith, 1 AD3d at 934; see generally Matter of Czerwiak v Wing, 245 AD2d 1098, 1098 [4th Dept 1997]).

We reject petitioner's further contention that supplemental evidence was allowed at the administrative hearing and therefore respondent's determination was affected by an error of law inasmuch as we conclude that respondent complied with the regulations (see 18 NYCRR 359.5, 359.7). Petitioner's remaining contention, that she is entitled to attorneys’ fees, is without merit (see generally CPLR 8601 [a]).

Entered: March 27, 2026

Ann Dillon Flynn

Clerk of the Court