PEOPLE v. CARUTH (2026)

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Robert A. Neary, J., at suppression hearing, jury trial, and sentencing), rendered October 3, 2018, convicting defendant of manslaughter in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 25 years, unanimously affirmed.

The hearing court properly denied defendant's suppression motion.  The initial search, conducted the day the police were alerted to the missing victim, was justified on both emergency exception and consent grounds.  Given that it was winter, and given that the missing woman was four months pregnant, had no history of mental illness, had left her keys and phone behind, and was believed to have gone into the basement, the search for the victim in the basement area was reasonable (see People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177–178, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607 [1976], cert denied 426 U.S. 953, 96 S.Ct. 3178, 49 L.Ed.2d 1191 [1976];  see also People v. Love, 84 N.Y.2d 917, 918–919, 620 N.Y.S.2d 809, 644 N.E.2d 1365 [1994] ).  The emergency exception reflects “the general obligation of police officers to assist persons whom they reasonably believe to be in distress” (Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d at 177, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607), and may apply even where the police do not definitely know whether a crime has occurred (see People v. Doll, 21 N.Y.3d 665, 671, 975 N.Y.S.2d 721, 998 N.E.2d 384 [2013], cert denied 572 U.S. 1022, 134 S.Ct. 1552, 188 L.Ed.2d 568 [2014];  see generally People v. Molnar, 98 N.Y.2d 328, 332–333, 746 N.Y.S.2d 673, 774 N.E.2d 738 [2002] ).  Moreover, the victim's boyfriend, who also lived in the house, had apparent authority to consent to the search of the basement (People v. Vasquez, 298 A.D.2d 230, 748 N.Y.S.2d 562 [1st Dept 2002], lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 543, 763 N.Y.S.2d 9, 793 N.E.2d 423 [2003] ).

Defendant also consented to the searches that occurred the following day.  Whether consent has been given voluntarily must be determined by the totality of the circumstances, including whether the consenter was in custody or handcuffed;  the number of officers present;  the background of the consenter;  whether the consenter cooperated or resisted;  and whether the consenter was advised of his right to refuse consent (see e.g. People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 128–130, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215, 347 N.E.2d 575 [1976];  People v. Hill, 153 A.D.3d 413, 417, 60 N.Y.S.3d 23 [1st Dept 2017], affd 33 N.Y.3d 1076, 104 N.Y.S.3d 598, 128 N.E.3d 676 [2019] ).  The suppression court's credibility determinations are “entitled to great deference on the question of voluntariness, unless they were manifestly erroneous or plainly unjustified by the evidence” (Hill, 153 A.D.3d at 417, 60 N.Y.S.3d 23;  see People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 761–762, 395 N.Y.S.2d 635, 363 N.E.2d 1380 [1977] ).

Defendant accompanied the officers to the basement during the first search that day, and acquiesced when they returned that evening to reexamine a bag that had an unusual stain on it.  Defendant did not object to their presence, did not ask them to leave, was generally cooperative throughout, and was not under arrest or detained at the time.  Defendant's actions under the circumstances constituted tacit consent (see People v. Cortes, 155 A.D.3d 579, 580, 66 N.Y.S.3d 1 [1st Dept 2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1114, 77 N.Y.S.3d 339, 101 N.E.3d 980 [2018];  see also People v. Smith, 239 A.D.2d 219, 220–221, 658 N.Y.S.2d 259 [1st Dept 1997], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 908, 663 N.Y.S.2d 520, 686 N.E.2d 232 [1997] ).  Accordingly, suppression of the evidence discovered during the warrantless searches and pursuant to the subsequent warrant was properly denied.

The verdict comported with the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007];  see also People v. Baque, 43 N.Y.3d 26, 229 N.Y.S.3d 62, 254 N.E.3d 606 [2024] ).  We find no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations and the testimony of the forensic experts.  The evidence, including defendant's print in the victim's blood on a wall which could not have been placed there prior to the victim's death, in addition to defendant's epithelial cells under the victim's nail and defendant's shoe with the victim's blood found in defendant's car, supports a reasonable inference that defendant, with at least the intent to cause serious physical injury to her, caused the victim's death (see Penal Law § 125.20).  The fact that the jury acquitted defendant of the murder count does not warrant a different conclusion (see People v. Rayam, 94 N.Y.2d 557, 561–563, 708 N.Y.S.2d 37, 729 N.E.2d 694 [2000] ).

Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the testifying medical examiner's report as to the cause of the victim's death (see generally People v. Cabrera, 41 N.Y.3d 35, 45, 207 N.Y.S.3d 18, 230 N.E.3d 1082 [2023];  People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 20, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919 [1995] ), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice.  Moreover, the cause of the victim's death was not at issue, and as a result, defendant was not prejudiced by introduction of the autopsy report and any error is therefore harmless (People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 [1975] ).

We perceive no basis for reducing defendant's sentence.