IN RE: SHELTERING ARMS CHILDREN'S SERVICES (2026)

Order, Family Court, New York County (Stephanie Schwartz, J.), entered on or about May 6, 2025, which determined that respondent mother's counsel was precluded from asking leading questions in his cross-examination of the mother, whom the petitioner agency called as a witness on its direct case against the mother, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

While the subject order is not appealable as of right (Family Court Act § 1112[a]) because this case is based on permanent neglect, and a potential finding of permanent neglect would constitute a permanent and significant stigma that may impact the mother's status in future proceedings, we deem the notice of appeal to be a request for leave to appeal, and grant the request (see Matter of Nekia C. [Kevin E.C. — Laurel S. McC.], 155 A.D.3d 431, 432, 63 N.Y.S.3d 234 [1st Dept. 2017]).

Family Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding the mother's counsel from cross-examining her after petitioner agency called her as a witness on its case-in-chief.  Trial courts have well-established and broad authority to control courtroom proceedings (see Jackson v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 109 A.D.3d 762, 763, 971 N.Y.S.2d 528 [1st Dept. 2013], lv denied, 22 N.Y.3d 858, 2013 WL 5355444 [2013]), including witness examination (see People v. Weaver, 302 A.D.2d 872, 873, 753 N.Y.S.2d 781 [4th Dept. 2003], lv denied 99 N.Y.3d 633, 760 N.Y.S.2d 115, 790 N.E.2d 289 [2003]).  When an adverse party is called as a witness on the other party's case in chief, the court may permit the use of leading questions against that witness upon a showing of hostility, adversity, evasiveness or uncooperativeness (see Matter of Maria A.M. v. Dextor N., 95 A.D.3d 578, 579, 944 N.Y.S.2d 91 [1st Dept. 2012];  Matter of Giaquinto, 164 A.D.3d 1527, 1530–1531, 83 N.Y.S.3d 728 [3d Dept. 2018], affd 32 N.Y.3d 1180, 94 N.Y.S.3d 244, 118 N.E.3d 906 [2019]).

Here, although the agency called the mother as an adverse witness and was permitted to ask leading questions, the mother's counsel made no showing that the mother would be hostile, evasive, or biased against her own counsel.  Accordingly, the rationale underlying the use of leading questions — the need to control a reluctant or adverse witness — was entirely absent during counsel's examination of his own client.

Further, counsel was free to call the mother on her direct case.  We have reviewed the mother's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.