IN RE: A.M.G. and Another (2026)

Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (E. Grace Park, J.), entered on or about September 24, 2024, to the extent it brings up for review a fact-finding order, same court and Judge, entered on or about September 20, 2024, which found that respondent mother abused her daughter and derivatively abused and neglected her son, unanimously affirmed, and the appeal from the order of disposition otherwise dismissed, without costs, as taken from a nonappealable order.

A preponderance of the evidence supports Family Court's determination that respondent mother abused her daughter or allowed her daughter to be sexually abused, and derivatively abused and neglected her son (see Family Court Act §§ 1012[e][iii][a];  1046[b][i];  Matter of J.L. [J.A.L.], 228 A.D.3d 474, 474, 212 N.Y.S.3d 627 [1st Dept. 2024]).  The daughter's certified medical records indicating that she tested positive for chlamydia established a prima facie case of abuse, creating a rebuttable presumption that the mother was responsible, even if the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that she committed or had actual knowledge of the abuse (see Matter of Philip M., 82 N.Y.2d 238, 245–246, 604 N.Y.S.2d 40, 624 N.E.2d 168 [1993];  Matter of Magnolia A., 272 A.D.2d 115, 116, 707 N.Y.S.2d 176 [1st Dept. 2000], lv dismissed 95 N.Y.2d 902, 716 N.Y.S.2d 642, 739 N.E.2d 1147 [2000]).  There is no basis for disturbing Family Court's credibility determinations (see Matter of Irene O., 38 N.Y.2d 776, 777, 381 N.Y.S.2d 865, 345 N.E.2d 337 [1975]), including its rejection of the mother's testimony offering for the first time the explanation that the child had symptoms of vaginal discharge and yellow eyes at birth and again when she was about two years old (see Matter of Jasmin O., 222 A.D.2d 240, 635 N.Y.S.2d 19 [1st Dept. 1995]).  The mother also failed to rebut petitioner's showing that she had access to her daughter, and that the child was in her care at the time her daughter's condition was diagnosed.

The finding of derivative abuse and neglect against the mother for her son was appropriate.  Although a finding that the daughter was sexually abused does not, in and of itself, establish that the son has been derivatively abused and neglected (see Matter of Abigail S., 21 A.D.3d 380, 381, 800 N.Y.S.2d 39 [2d Dept. 2005]), here, the mother's abuse of her daughter or in allowing that child to be sexually abused evinced a flawed understanding of a parent's duties and impaired parental judgment sufficient to support Family Court's findings of derivative abuse and neglect as to her son (see Matter of Vincent M., 193 A.D.2d 398, 404, 597 N.Y.S.2d 309 [1st Dept. 1993]).  That the son was unaware that his sister was being sexually abused does not require a different result (see Matter of Karime R. [Robin P.], 147 A.D.3d 439, 441, 46 N.Y.S.3d 581 [1st Dept. 2017]).

To the extent the mother seeks to challenge the court's disposition, which, among other things, placed the children in the custody of the Commissioner of Social Services of Bronx County until the completion of the next permanency hearing, directed her to comply with services, and abide by the order of protection issued on behalf of the children, the appeal is dismissed as the mother concedes in her brief that she consented to that order, which has expired (see Matter of Markeith G. [Deon W.], 152 A.D.3d 424, 425, 58 N.Y.S.3d 359 [1st Dept. 2017]).