ALVARADO v. LOCAL 1549 CLERICAL ADMINISTRATIVE EMPLOYEES (2026)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Arthur F. Engoron, J.), entered on or about April 7, 2025, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In this action for unpaid wages, plaintiff alleges that he was “hired by Local 1549 under the purview of [defendant DC 37] and AFSCME as a Coordinator of Strategic Planning and Special Projects,” and that “[d]efendants terminated [p]laintiff without explanation and refused to pay him any severance pay.”

Plaintiff alleges that he was a member of DC 37's professional employees’ union, the Federation of Field Representatives (FFR), “which has a[CBA] with ․ DC 37.”  The CBA provides that “[s]everance pay shall be paid to an employee ․ who is discharged,” and that employees hired after 2005 “accrue severance pay of one week's pay for every 12 months of service.”  Plaintiff further alleges that the DC 37 Employee Manual similarly states that “[s]everance pay shall be paid to employees who are discharged” and “shall amount to one week's pay for each full year of service.”  Plaintiff specifically alleges that his “employment relationship” with defendants “was governed by [the] Employee Manual with DC 37 and a Union Contract [i.e., the CBA] between DC 37, AFSCME, and [FFR].” In his complaint plaintiff asserts causes of action for violation of New York Labor Law § 198–c, breach of contract, implied contract, promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit.

Plaintiff's cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 198–c was properly dismissed because that specific provision of the Labor Law does not create a private right of action (see e.g. Stoganovic v. Dinolfo, 92 A.D.2d 729, 729, 461 N.Y.S.2d 121 [4th Dept. 1983], affd 61 N.Y.2d 812, 473 N.Y.S.2d 972, 462 N.E.2d 149 [1984]).  In any event, the claim pursuant to § 198–c is preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (see Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 327–328 [2d Cir. 1985]).

We affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's contract and quasi-contract claims “for reasons other than those stated by the motion court” (J. Remora Maintenance LLC v. Efromovich, 103 A.D.3d 501, 501, 960 N.Y.S.2d 27 [1st Dept. 2013], lv denied 21 N.Y.3d 862, 2013 WL 4516338 [2013]).  While the court did not reach defendants’ argument based on the unions’ status as unincorporated associations, we affirm on that ground.  Plaintiff was required to, but did not, plead “that the entire membership authorized and later ratified [defendants’] actions” (Dowlah v. Am. Arbitration Assn., 221 A.D.3d 426, 427, 199 N.Y.S.3d 474 [1st Dept. 2023], lv denied 41 N.Y.3d 910, 2024 WL 3057580 [2024]), as required by (Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 280, 101 N.E.2d 683 [1951];  see Palladino v. CNY Centro, Inc., 23 N.Y.3d 140, 146, 989 N.Y.S.2d 438, 12 N.E.3d 436 [2014]).  Plaintiff's contract and quasi-contract claims against his union employer do not fall within the “narrow exception to the Martin rule” for “suit[s] by a union member against a union arising from wrongful expulsion” (id. at 147–148, 989 N.Y.S.2d 438, 12 N.E.3d 436).

We have considered plaintiff's additional arguments and find them unavailing.