CUMMINGS v. CITY OF NEW YORK (2026)

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mitchell J. Danziger, J.), entered on or about July 3, 2024, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the first, second, fourth, and fifth causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion denied, and the causes of action reinstated.

The court correctly observed that employment discrimination cases are generally reviewed under notice pleading standards (see Vig v. New York Hairspray Co., L.P., 67 A.D.3d 140, 145, 885 N.Y.S.2d 74 [1st Dept. 2009]).  Indeed, a “plaintiff alleging employment discrimination need not plead specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination but need only give fair notice of the nature of the claim and its grounds” (id. [internal quotations and brackets omitted]).  In an action brought under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), “[f]air notice is all that is required to survive at the pleading stage” (Petit v. Department of Educ. of City of N.Y., 177 A.D.3d 402, 403, 113 N.Y.S.3d 30 [1st Dept. 2019]).

The NYSHRL was amended in 2019 to “put in place a more lenient standard of liability that has been likened to that of the NYCHRL” (Yost v. Everyrealm, Inc., 657 F.Supp.3d 563, 578 [S.D.N.Y. 2023].  The court found, under the current statutory schemes, that plaintiff alleged facts from which it could be inferred that she was treated less well, at least in part, because of her protected status as a woman (see Suri v. Grey Global Group, Inc., 164 A.D.3d 108, 114, 83 N.Y.S.3d 9 [1st Dept. 2018], appeal dismissed 32 N.Y.3d 1138, 92 N.Y.S.3d 174, 116 N.E.3d 658 [2019];  Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 [2d Cir. 2013]).

Although a “single, isolated comment” or “stray remark” will not always suffice to sustain a discrimination or hostile work environment claim (see Suri, 164 A.D.3d at 111, 83 N.Y.S.3d 9), “a single comment that objectifies women being made in circumstances where that comment would, for example, signal views about the role of women in the workplace” could be actionable (Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 80 n 30, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27 [1st Dept. 2009], lv denied 13 N.Y.3d 702, 2009 WL 2622097 [2009];  see Tulino v. City of New York, 2016 WL 2967847, *4 [S.D.N.Y., May 19, 2016, No. 15CV7106 (JMF)]).  Here, where plaintiff alleged that her supervisor implied that she only received high evaluation scores because she was engaging in sexual relations with higher-ups, the alleged remarks and attendant hostile conduct were more than “petty slights and trivial inconveniences” (cf.  Lent v. City of New York, 209 A.D.3d 494, 495, 175 N.Y.S.3d 525 [1st Dept. 2022], lv dismissed 39 N.Y.3d 1118, 2023 WL 3011751 [2023]).

We have considered the parties’ remaining claims and find them unavailing.