IN RE: the P. & E. T. FOUNDATION. (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously vacated on the law without costs.

Memorandum: This appeal arises from a petition and amended petition pursuant to, inter alia, SCPA 1420 seeking construction of certain trust documents related to the P. & E. T. Foundation (Foundation), a charitable trust, as well as a subsequent petition pursuant to SCPA 2102 (6) and 2107 (2) seeking, inter alia, to enjoin Cynthia T. Doyle, Robert M. Doyle, Mollie T. Byrnes, John H. Byrnes, Peter Byrnes, Mollie Doyle, Donna Owens, James Weiss, and David Welbourn (collectively, respondents) from removing petitioner as attorney trustee for the Foundation. Following the latter of those petitions, the parties engaged in mediation. In October 2022, respondents provided petitioner with two “global settlement proposals” designed to address all of the parties’ outstanding issues and “completely remove[ ] [petitioner] and his family members from any involvement with the Tower entities and family.” Although petitioner purportedly accepted one of those settlement proposals, a dispute arose as to whether the proposal had been withdrawn prior to its acceptance. Following that dispute, mediation continued. In April 2023, the parties signed a “Mediator Settlement Proposal Final,” a second global settlement proposal that addressed many of the same concerns as the October 2022 proposals with additional and amended terms. A dispute arose, however, as to whether a signature from the Office of the Attorney General was required before the April 2023 proposal became binding.

Petitioner thereafter moved by order to show cause seeking, inter alia, an order “[d]eclaring that the terms recited in that certain [April 2023 proposal] ․ constitute a final and binding settlement contract,” or, in the alternative, “declaring that the ‘first proposal’ in that certain [October 2022 proposal] ․ accepted by [p]etitioner ․ constitutes a final and binding settlement contract.” Surrogate's Court effectively denied the motion and determined that neither proposal was enforceable. Petitioner appeals. We vacate the order on the ground that the Surrogate lacked the authority to entertain the relief requested by petitioner's order to show cause (see generally Matter of Allen v. Fiedler, 96 A.D.3d 1682, 1682, 947 N.Y.S.2d 863 [4th Dept. 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 815, 2012 WL 2478244 [2012]; Matter of Byrnes v. County of Monroe, 122 A.D.2d 549, 549, 505 N.Y.S.2d 473 [4th Dept. 1986]).

CPLR 3001 vests the authority to grant declaratory relief in Supreme Court. Thus, “[u]nless there is some other provision conferring declaratory jurisdiction on the particular court ․ the court will not have it” (Patrick M. Conners, Prac Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, CPLR C3001:20; see generally Kimmel v. State of New York, 29 N.Y.3d 386, 393, 57 N.Y.S.3d 678, 80 N.E.3d 370 [2017]; Byrnes, 122 A.D.2d at 550, 505 N.Y.S.2d 473; Wikarski v. State of New York, 91 A.D.2d 1174, 1174, 459 N.Y.S.2d 143 [4th Dept. 1983]). Even where the subject matter of a particular case falls within the subject matter generally heard by a court of limited jurisdiction, requests for declaratory relief must, nevertheless, typically be heard in Supreme Court (see North Waterside Redevelopment Co. v. Febbraro, 256 A.D.2d 261, 262, 682 N.Y.S.2d 202 [1st Dept. 1998], lv dismissed 93 N.Y.2d 888, 689 N.Y.S.2d 430, 711 N.E.2d 644 [1999]).

That being said, so long as Surrogate's Court possesses jurisdiction over a particular matter, the Surrogate “[i]n the exercise of [their] jurisdiction ․ shall have all of the powers that the supreme court would have in like actions and proceedings” (SCPA 209 [10]). The statute, for example, expressly grants the Surrogate the power to “determine” certain things regarding, inter alia, estate property and trusts (SCPA 209 [4], [6], [10]). Thus, courts have concluded that, although not necessarily in the form of a declaratory judgment, the Surrogate has the authority to make determinations as to the rights to or ownership of estate or trust property (see Matter of Mastroianni, 105 A.D.3d 1136, 1137-1138, 962 N.Y.S.2d 780 [3d Dept 2013]; Carmel v. Shor, 250 A.D.2d 475, 476, 672 N.Y.S.2d 866 [1st Dept. 1998]; Matter of Greenwold, 236 A.D.2d 400, 401, 653 N.Y.S.2d 625 [2d Dept. 1997]; Matter of Langfur, 198 A.D.2d 355, 355-356, 603 N.Y.S.2d 576 [2d Dept. 1993]).

Without deciding the precise extent or scope of the Surrogate's authority to entertain requests for declaratory or quasi-declaratory relief, we conclude that the Surrogate lacked such authority under the circumstances of this case. Both the October 2022 and April 2023 proposals underlying petitioner's request for declaratory relief represented attempts at a global settlement resolving a myriad of issues that had arisen between the parties and their families, much of which extended beyond the relief contemplated by the petitions before the Surrogate. The October 2022 and April 2023 proposals had terms regarding, inter alia, payment of attorney fees, payments owed to petitioner, payments petitioner would waive, claims pending against petitioner in other actions, releases from personal liability, health insurance for petitioner, and certain things that the parties agreed to do post-settlement. Both proposals explicitly referenced a separate action pending in federal court, stating that the federal action would be dismissed against petitioner and another individual who was not a party to this proceeding.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the Surrogate possessed authority to make declarations or determinations related to certain aspects of the October 2022 or April 2023 proposals, we conclude that substantive portions of those proposals involved disputes that were not properly before the Surrogate and thus the requested relief, i.e., a declaration that either of the proposals were binding, must be sought in an action in the Supreme Court (see generally Matter of Trump, 68 Misc 3d 593, 595, 126 N.Y.S.3d 901 [Sur. Ct., Queens County 2020]). Indeed, as noted, both the October 2022 and April 2023 proposals, among other things, effectively settled a separate action over which the Surrogate lacked jurisdiction. Because the matters outside of the Surrogate's jurisdiction were inextricably intertwined with the other terms of the proposals, we conclude that the Surrogate lacked the authority to grant declaratory relief or otherwise determine the validity or enforceability of either the October 2022 or April 2023 proposals (see Matter of Berkowitz, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 30164[U] *4, 2016 WL 429882 [Sur. Ct., NY County. 2016]).