PEOPLE v. SEARLES (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a plea of guilty, of attempted assault in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.05 [2]). Defendant's sole contention consists of a challenge to the legality of the minimum period of the indeterminate sentence of imprisonment imposed by County Court. As defendant correctly asserts and the People correctly concede, defendant's contention would survive even a valid waiver of the right to appeal (see People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 255, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006]; People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022 [1989]; People v. Balkum, 288 A.D.2d 910, 910, 733 N.Y.S.2d 670 [4th Dept. 2001]). Consequently, we need not address the validity of the appeal waiver (see People v. Smith [appeal No. 2], 237 A.D.3d 1531, 1532, 232 N.Y.S.3d 819 [4th Dept. 2025]). Nonetheless, defendant's challenge to the legality of the minimum period of the indeterminate sentence was rendered moot by his release to parole supervision (see Balkum, 288 A.D.2d at 910, 733 N.Y.S.2d 670), and we conclude that the exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply (see Smith, 237 A.D.3d at 1532, 232 N.Y.S.3d 819; see generally Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714-715, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 [1980]). We therefore dismiss the appeal.