PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10 [1]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [3]). The prosecution stems from defendant's possession of a firearm and his use of that firearm to shoot a victim in the neck outside of a house party.

Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes of which defendant was convicted as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007]), we reject his contention that the verdict with respect to those crimes is against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987]). Indeed, a different verdict with respect to those crimes would have been unreasonable in light of the multiple eyewitness accounts and the surveillance footage admitted at trial (see generally Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d at 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1).

Contrary to defendant's further contention, County Court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. When a defendant is charged with “simple” weapon possession (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]), “[s]o long as [the] defendant knowingly unlawfully possesses a loaded firearm before forming the intent to cause a crime with that weapon, the possessory crime has already been completed, and consecutive sentencing is permissible” (People v. Brown, 21 N.Y.3d 739, 751, 977 N.Y.S.2d 723, 999 N.E.2d 1168 [2013]; see People v. Malloy, 33 N.Y.3d 1078, 1080, 104 N.Y.S.3d 595, 128 N.E.3d 673 [2019]). Here, the evidence at trial establishes that, on the night of the shooting, defendant and others at the house party were outside several minutes before defendant pulled out the gun and shot the victim, and thus the evidence “support[s] the conclusion that defendant possessed the weapon for a sufficient period of time before forming the specific intent to [cause the victim serious physical injury]” (Malloy, 33 N.Y.3d at 1080, 104 N.Y.S.3d 595, 128 N.E.3d 673; see People v. Clinton, 222 A.D.3d 1427, 1429, 201 N.Y.S.3d 827 [4th Dept. 2023], lv denied 41 N.Y.3d 1017, 214 N.Y.S.3d 314, 237 N.E.3d 1254 [2024]; People v. Porteous, 219 A.D.3d 757, 759, 195 N.Y.S.3d 222 [2d Dept. 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 1081, 202 N.Y.S.3d 767, 225 N.E.3d 887 [2023]).

Defendant further contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon, inter alia, defense counsel's failure to request a Molineux instruction and his failure to object to statements made by the prosecutor during summation. “ ‘Although the failure to request limiting instructions may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if the error were so serious that defendant did not receive a fair trial’ ” (People v. Orcutt, 51 A.D.3d 1404, 1405, 860 N.Y.S.2d 924 [4th Dept. 2008]), here, defense counsel may have had a strategic reason for failing to request a Molineux limiting instruction inasmuch as he may not have wished to draw further attention to the admitted Molineux evidence (see People v. Case, 197 A.D.3d 985, 988, 153 N.Y.S.3d 331 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1160, 160 N.Y.S.3d 689, 181 N.E.3d 1117 [2022]). Even assuming, arguendo, that any of the prosecutor's comments during summation exceeded the bounds of propriety, we conclude that they were “not so pervasive or egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial” (People v. Jackson, 108 A.D.3d 1079, 1080, 968 N.Y.S.2d 789 [4th Dept. 2013], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 997, 981 N.Y.S.2d 2, 3 N.E.3d 1170 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Inasmuch as we conclude “that the prosecutor either did not engage in misconduct, or that any error did not deny defendant a fair trial, we conclude that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to object” (People v. Garrow, 171 A.D.3d 1542, 1547, 99 N.Y.S.3d 827 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 931, 109 N.Y.S.3d 752, 133 N.E.3d 459 [2019]). Upon our review of all of defendant's allegations of error concerning the representation provided by defense counsel, we conclude that defendant “ ‘failed to satisfy the well-settled, high burden of showing that he was deprived of a fair trial and meaningful representation sufficient to warrant a reversal’ ” (Case, 197 A.D.3d at 988, 153 N.Y.S.3d 331, quoting People v. Flores, 84 N.Y.2d 184, 189, 615 N.Y.S.2d 662, 639 N.E.2d 19 [1994]; see generally People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 [1981]).

Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.