IN RE: DAX S. and Remi S. (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, terminated her parental rights with respect to the subject children on the ground of permanent neglect, transferred guardianship and custody of the children to petitioner, and freed the children for adoption. We affirm.

Contrary to the mother's contention, Family Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to enter a suspended judgment. A suspended judgment “is a brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with the child” (Matter of Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 311, 590 N.Y.S.2d 60, 604 N.E.2d 122 [1992]; see Matter of Danaryee B. [Erica T.], 151 A.D.3d 1765, 1766, 56 N.Y.S.3d 755 [4th Dept. 2017]; see also Family Ct Act § 633). It “is only appropriate where the parent has clearly demonstrated that [they] deserve[ ] another opportunity to show that [they have] the ability to be a fit parent” (Matter of Matthew S., Jr. [Matthew S.], 169 A.D.3d 1456, 1456, 91 N.Y.S.3d 767 [4th Dept. 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “The determination of whether to grant a suspended judgment must be based solely on the best interests of the child” (id.; see § 631).

Here, the record establishes that the mother had admitted that she neglected the children by reason of her substance use and her failure to engage in substance abuse counseling and treatment. Her service contract required her to engage in a substance abuse program, but she had not done so for over a year at the time of the dispositional hearing. The mother admitted that she continued to drink alcohol and had overdosed on some substance just a month before she testified. She also denied needing treatment for substance abuse.

A suspended judgment “is not warranted where the parent has not made sufficient progress in addressing the issues that led to the child[ren]’s removal from custody” (Matter of Nolin X.A.C. [Nicky C.], 240 A.D.3d 1388, 1388, 236 N.Y.S.3d 465 [4th Dept. 2025]; see Matter of London J. [Niaya W.], 138 A.D.3d 1457, 1457-1458, 30 N.Y.S.3d 453 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 912, 2016 WL 4480707 [2016]; Matter of Alex C., Jr. [Alex C., Sr.], 114 A.D.3d 1149, 1150, 980 N.Y.S.2d 187 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 901, 2014 WL 1704499 [2014]). The court's determination that it would not be appropriate to give the mother additional time through a suspended judgment is entitled to great deference (see Nolin X.A.C., 240 A.D.3d at 1389, 236 N.Y.S.3d 465; Matthew S., Jr., 169 A.D.3d at 1456, 91 N.Y.S.3d 767). The children had been in the care of the foster parents for almost two years by the time of the dispositional hearing, and the children had bonded with the foster parents and were doing well. We conclude that the court properly determined that a suspended judgment was unwarranted (see Matter of Patience E. [Victoria E.], 225 A.D.3d 1181, 1183, 207 N.Y.S.3d 766 [4th Dept. 2024], lv denied 42 N.Y.3d 904, 2024 WL 4204807 [2024]) and that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children (see Nolin X.A.C., 240 A.D.3d at 1389, 236 N.Y.S.3d 465).