IN RE: NOAH P. (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, respondent father appeals from an order that, inter alia, terminated his parental rights with respect to the subject child on the ground of permanent neglect and freed the child for adoption. We affirm.

Contrary to the father's contention, petitioner established that it exercised diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parent-child relationship, as required by Social Services Law § 384-b (7) (a). “Diligent efforts include reasonable attempts at providing counseling, scheduling regular visitation with the child, providing services to the parent[ ] to overcome problems that prevent the discharge of the child into their care, and informing the parent[ ] of [the] child's progress” (Matter of Jemma M. [Ashley M.], 237 A.D.3d 1569, 1569-1570, 232 N.Y.S.3d 835 [4th Dept. 2025], lv denied 44 N.Y.3d 908, 2025 WL 3545552 [2025] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see § 384-b [7] [f]; Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136, 142, 481 N.Y.S.2d 26, 470 N.E.2d 824 [1984]; Matter of Zander W. [Lisa M.], 222 A.D.3d 1395, 1396, 202 N.Y.S.3d 605 [4th Dept. 2023], lv denied 41 N.Y.3d 909, 2024 WL 2966070 [2024]). Here, petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence (see § 384-b [3] [g] [i]) that it exercised diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the father's relationship with the child (see Jemma M., 237 A.D.3d at 1570, 232 N.Y.S.3d 835; Matter of Janette G. [Julie G.], 181 A.D.3d 1308, 1308-1309, 119 N.Y.S.3d 796 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 907, 2020 WL 3422455 [2020]). Petitioner provided the father with referrals to appropriate services, supervised the father's visitation with the child, communicated with the father frequently regarding his progress toward reunification, emphasized the importance of living apart from respondent mother, advised the father that—in addition to completing the recommended services—he must also implement the skills he learned through such services, and regularly updated the father on the child's well-being. Petitioner was not required, under the circumstances of this case, to establish that it also investigated alternative placements with relatives (cf. Matter of Caidence M. [Francis W.M.], 162 A.D.3d 1539, 1539-1540, 78 N.Y.S.3d 558 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 905, 2018 WL 4924781 [2018]).

Contrary to the further contention of the father, we conclude that, despite petitioner's diligent efforts, the father failed to plan for the child's future (see Social Services Law § 384-b [7] [a]). To “ ‘plan for the future of the child’ ” means to “take such steps as may be necessary to provide an adequate, stable home and parental care for the child” (§ 384-b [7] [c]). Notably, the plan must be “realistic and feasible” (id.) and, “[a]t a minimum, parents must take steps to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the child from their home” (Matter of Nathaniel T., 67 N.Y.2d 838, 840, 501 N.Y.S.2d 647, 492 N.E.2d 775 [1986] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the evidence established that the father failed to make progress in a clinical visitation program, failed to make progress in the recommended domestic violence program, failed to engage in mental health treatment, failed to accept responsibility for his actions that led to the child's removal, failed to progress to unsupervised visitation with the child, and failed to develop a realistic plan to provide an adequate and stable home for the child (see Matter of Natalee F. [Eric F.], 194 A.D.3d 1397, 1398, 143 N.Y.S.3d 639 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 911, 2021 WL 4612465 [2021]). Although the father attended some of the services that he was referred to, he failed to “benefit from the services offered and utilize the tools or lessons learned in those classes in order to successfully plan for the [child's] future” (Matter of Albina H. [John H.], 229 A.D.3d 1169, 1170, 214 N.Y.S.3d 874 [4th Dept. 2024], lv denied 42 N.Y.3d 903, 2024 WL 4151604 [2024] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Tori-Lynn L. [Troy L.], 227 A.D.3d 1455, 1458, 210 N.Y.S.3d 580 [4th Dept. 2024]).

The father also contends that Family Court erred in relying on portions of certain exhibits containing the progress and visitation notes from petitioner and the agency that supervised visitation with the child because such portions did not meet the foundational requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518 [a]). The father's only objection to the exhibits in question, however, concerned the admissibility of certain hearsay statements contained within the exhibits—regardless of whether the exhibits themselves qualified as business records—and that objection was sustained. We thus conclude that he did not preserve his current contention for our review (see Matter of Britiny U. [Tara S.], 124 A.D.3d 964, 965, 1 N.Y.S.3d 477 [3d Dept. 2015]; Matter of Cory S. [Terry W.], 70 A.D.3d 1321, 1322, 897 N.Y.S.2d 322 [4th Dept. 2010]). In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that the court erred in relying upon the alleged inadmissible evidence, we conclude that the error is harmless inasmuch as “the record otherwise contains ample evidence supporting [the] [c]ourt's determination” (Matter of Brooklyn S. [Stafania Q.—Devin S.], 150 A.D.3d 1698, 1700, 52 N.Y.S.3d 607 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 919, 2017 WL 4051983 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Carmela H. [Danielle F.], 185 A.D.3d 1460, 1461, 126 N.Y.S.3d 602 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 915, 2020 WL 6065580 [2020]).

Finally, we reject the father's contention that the court abused its discretion in refusing to enter a suspended judgment (see Matter of Tumario B. [Valerie L.], 83 A.D.3d 1412, 1412, 919 N.Y.S.2d 730 [4th Dept. 2011], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 705, 2011 WL 2535195 [2011]; Matter of Elijah D. [Allison D.], 74 A.D.3d 1846, 1847, 902 N.Y.S.2d 736 [4th Dept. 2010]). A suspended judgment “is a brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with the child” (Matter of Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 311, 590 N.Y.S.2d 60, 604 N.E.2d 122 [1992]; see Family Ct Act § 633), and may be warranted where the parent has made sufficient progress in addressing the issues that led to the child's removal from custody (see generally Matter of James P. [Tiffany H.], 148 A.D.3d 1526, 1527, 49 N.Y.S.3d 209 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 908, 2017 WL 2367946 [2017]; Matter of Sapphire A.J. [Angelica J.], 122 A.D.3d 1296, 1297, 995 N.Y.S.2d 654 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 916, 2015 WL 687370 [2015]). Here, the evidence at the dispositional hearing established that the father had made no progress in addressing the issues that led to the removal of the child and that he still had only supervised visits with the child. We therefore conclude that the court properly determined that a suspended judgment was unwarranted, and that the best interests of the child would be served by freeing the child for adoption, thereby “provid[ing] him with prospects for permanency and some sense of the stability he deserve[s]” (Matter of Raine QQ., 51 A.D.3d 1106, 1107, 857 N.Y.S.2d 333 [3d Dept. 2008], lv denied 10 N.Y.3d 717, 862 N.Y.S.2d 469, 892 N.E.2d 863 [2008]; see Matter of Brandon I.J. [Daisy D.], 198 A.D.3d 1310, 1311, 155 N.Y.S.3d 652 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 901, 2022 WL 803787 [2022]; Elijah D., 74 A.D.3d at 1847, 902 N.Y.S.2d 736).