PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of one count of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]) and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [1] [b]; [3]).

Contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that the oral colloquy, together with the written waiver of the right to appeal, “ ‘was sufficient to support a knowing and voluntary waiver under the totality of the circumstances’ ” (People v. Jones, 239 A.D.3d 1475, 1476, 234 N.Y.S.3d 888 [4th Dept. 2025]; see People v. Hannah T., 240 A.D.3d 1260, 1261, 239 N.Y.S.3d 706 [4th Dept. 2025]; see generally People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 559-564, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970 [2019], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 2634, 206 L.Ed.2d 512 [2020]). Defendant, relying on (People v. Sutton, 184 A.D.3d 236, 244-245, 125 N.Y.S.3d 739 [2d Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1070, 129 N.Y.S.3d 385, 152 N.E.3d 1186 [2020]), also contends that the waiver is invalid because it was included as part of the plea agreement as offered by County Court and the court failed to sufficiently articulate the reasons for its demand. This Court, however, has not adopted the rule created by the Second Department (see People v. Gaines, 239 A.D.3d 1350, 1350, 235 N.Y.S.3d 812 [4th Dept. 2025]; People v. Figueroa, 230 A.D.3d 1581, 1583, 218 N.Y.S.3d 871 [4th Dept. 2024], lv denied 42 N.Y.3d 1079, 227 N.Y.S.3d 564, 252 N.E.3d 503 [2025]). In any event, the court here, unlike the trial court in Sutton, “included the appeal waiver as a condition of the plea offer prior to accepting defendant's plea and articulated on the record that the appeal waiver was required in order for defendant to secure the benefit of the sentencing limitation promised by the court” (Figueroa, 230 A.D.3d at 1583, 218 N.Y.S.3d 871; see Gaines, 239 A.D.3d at 1350, 235 N.Y.S.3d 812). Contrary to defendant's further contention, a waiver of the right to appeal is not unconscionable per se (see People v. Barr, 192 A.D.3d 1571, 1571, 140 N.Y.S.3d 858 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 954, 147 N.Y.S.3d 511, 170 N.E.3d 385 [2021]; see generally Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 557, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970), nor was it unconscionable for the court to demand a waiver of the right to appeal as a condition of a favorable plea bargain (see e.g. Gaines, 239 A.D.3d at 1350, 235 N.Y.S.3d 812; Figueroa, 230 A.D.3d at 1583, 218 N.Y.S.3d 871).

Defendant's valid waiver of the right to appeal precludes our review of his challenge to the severity of his sentence (see People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006]; People v. Brinkman, 240 A.D.3d 1431, 1432, 235 N.Y.S.3d 882 [4th Dept. 2025], lv denied 44 N.Y.3d 1027, 246 N.Y.S.3d 316, 272 N.E.3d 1153 [2025]), and we decline to reduce the sentence pursuant to our interest of justice jurisdiction (cf. Hannah T., 240 A.D.3d at 1262, 239 N.Y.S.3d 706).

Defendant's contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel survives his guilty plea and valid waiver of the right to appeal “only insofar as defendant contends that the plea bargaining process was infected by [the] allegedly ineffective assistance or that [he] entered the plea because of [his] attorney[’s] allegedly poor performance” (People v. Richards, 239 A.D.3d 1330, 1331, 232 N.Y.S.3d 852 [4th Dept. 2025], lv denied 44 N.Y.3d 1013, 244 N.Y.S.3d 491, 271 N.E.3d 693 [2025] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Molski, 179 A.D.3d 1540, 1540-1541, 118 N.Y.S.3d 870 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 972, 125 N.Y.S.3d 7, 148 N.E.3d 471 [2020]; People v. Rausch, 126 A.D.3d 1535, 1535, 6 N.Y.S.3d 863 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1149, 32 N.Y.S.3d 63, 51 N.E.3d 574 [2016]). “Where, as here, a defendant contends that [they were] denied the right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by both the Federal and New York State Constitutions, we evaluate the claim using the state standard, which affords greater protection than its federal counterpart” (People v. Conway, 148 A.D.3d 1739, 1741, 50 N.Y.S.3d 739 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1077, 64 N.Y.S.3d 167, 86 N.E.3d 254 [2017]; see People v. Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d 277, 282-284, 778 N.Y.S.2d 431, 810 N.E.2d 883 [2004], rearg denied 3 N.Y.3d 702, 785 N.Y.S.2d 29, 818 N.E.2d 671 [2004]). Under the state standard, “[s]o long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will have been met” (People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 [1981]; see People v. Kates, 162 A.D.3d 1627, 1631, 78 N.Y.S.3d 600 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1065, 89 N.Y.S.3d 120, 113 N.E.3d 954 [2018], reconsideration denied 32 N.Y.3d 1173, 97 N.Y.S.3d 582, 121 N.E.3d 209 [2019]). “In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant has been afforded meaningful representation when [they] receive[ ] an advantageous plea and nothing in the record casts doubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel” (People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 404, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265 [1995]; see Kates, 162 A.D.3d at 1631, 78 N.Y.S.3d 600; People v. Brown, 305 A.D.2d 1068, 1069, 759 N.Y.S.2d 830 [4th Dept. 2003], lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 579, 764 N.Y.S.2d 389, 796 N.E.2d 481 [2003]). Here, defense counsel secured a favorable plea bargain for defendant, and nothing in the record casts doubt on the apparent effectiveness of defense counsel (see Ford, 86 N.Y.2d at 404, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265; People v. Smith, 198 A.D.3d 1347, 1348, 155 N.Y.S.3d 255 [4th Dept. 2021]).