PEOPLE v. WRIGHT (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). We affirm.

Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987]).

We reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree. A court “may, in addition to submitting the greatest offense which it is required to submit, submit in the alternative any lesser included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence which would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser offense but did not commit the greater [offense]” (CPL 300.50 [1]). It is undisputed that manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.15 [1]) is a lesser included offense of murder in the second degree (§ 125.25 [1]), the charge for which defendant was originally indicted (see People v. Colon, 219 A.D.3d 1675, 1675, 197 N.Y.S.3d 780 [4th Dept. 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 1080, 202 N.Y.S.3d 772, 225 N.E.3d 891 [2023]; see generally CPL 1.20 [37]) and, thus, “ ‘the question simply is whether on any reasonable view of the evidence it is possible for the trier of the facts to acquit the defendant on the higher count and still find him guilty on the lesser one’ ” (People v. Hull, 27 N.Y.3d 1056, 1058, 35 N.Y.S.3d 284, 54 N.E.3d 1155 [2016]; see People v. Ott, 200 A.D.3d 1642, 1643, 159 N.Y.S.3d 295 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 953, 165 N.Y.S.3d 451, 185 N.E.3d 972 [2022], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 143 S.Ct. 403, 214 L.Ed.2d 200 [2022]). Here, the incident occurred during an altercation between numerous individuals, and given that the victim was some distance away from the other ongoing fighting when defendant ran up to the victim from behind and hit him in the head with a baseball bat with such force to fracture his skull into multiple pieces, we conclude that there is no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that defendant acted recklessly rather than intentionally (see generally People v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427, 434-435, 452 N.Y.S.2d 389, 437 N.E.2d 1146 [1982], rearg denied 57 N.Y.2d 775, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1033, 440 N.E.2d 1343 [1982]).

We reject defendant's contention that defense counsel was ineffective by failing in the pretrial omnibus motion to seek suppression of the identification testimony as unreliable inasmuch as that argument would have had little or no chance of success (see People v. Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d 277, 287, 778 N.Y.S.2d 431, 810 N.E.2d 883 [2004], rearg denied 3 N.Y.3d 702, 785 N.Y.S.2d 29, 818 N.E.2d 671 [2004]; People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705, 709, 530 N.Y.S.2d 52, 525 N.E.2d 698 [1988]). There is no merit to defendant's remaining allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel (see generally People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 152, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213 [2005]).

I respectfully dissent because, in my view, Supreme Court erred in declining to charge manslaughter in the second degree as a lesser included offense. I would therefore reverse the judgment and dismiss the indictment without prejudice to the People to re-present any appropriate charges to another grand jury (see People v. Collier, 303 A.D.2d 1008, 1009, 757 N.Y.S.2d 662 [4th Dept. 2003], lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 579, 764 N.Y.S.2d 389, 796 N.E.2d 481 [2003]).

A court “may, in addition to submitting the greatest offense which it is required to submit, submit in the alternative any lesser included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence which would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser offense but did not commit the greater” (CPL 300.50 [1]).

Here, manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.15 [1]) is a lesser included offense of murder in the second degree, the charge for which defendant was originally indicted (§ 125.25 [1]; see People v. Rivera, 23 N.Y.3d 112, 120, 989 N.Y.S.2d 446, 12 N.E.3d 444 [2014]; People v. Colon, 219 A.D.3d 1675, 1675, 197 N.Y.S.3d 780 [4th Dept. 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 1080, 202 N.Y.S.3d 772, 225 N.E.3d 891 [2023]; see generally CPL 1.20 [37]). The question therefore is whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence, examined in the light most favorable to defendant, to support a finding that he committed reckless manslaughter and not intentional murder (see Rivera, 23 N.Y.3d at 120-121, 989 N.Y.S.2d 446, 12 N.E.3d 444). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, as we must (see id.), I conclude that there is a reasonable view of the evidence supporting the conclusion that defendant acted recklessly, i.e., he was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk but did not intend to cause the death of another person (see Penal Law §§ 15.05 [3]; 125.15 [1]; 125.25 [1]; see generally People v. Holloway, 130 A.D.2d 933, 933, 516 N.Y.S.2d 553 [4th Dept. 1987], lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 751, 520 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 514 N.E.2d 1378 [1987]), and defendant was thus entitled to that charge. This is particularly true inasmuch as the jury acquitted defendant of murder in the second degree and instead convicted him of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree (§ 125.20 [1]; see generally People v. McIntosh, 162 A.D.3d 1612, 1615-1616, 78 N.Y.S.3d 856 [4th Dept. 2018], affd 33 N.Y.3d 1064, 104 N.Y.S.3d 46, 128 N.E.3d 173 [2019]). I therefore conclude that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury with the requested lesser included charge of manslaughter in the second degree (see People v. Diaz, 66 A.D.2d 752, 752, 411 N.Y.S.2d 592 [1st Dept. 1978]).