DOUGHERTY v. CITY OF NEW YORK (2026)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Machelle J. Sweeting, J.), entered on or about January 8, 2025, which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and denied plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to file an amended complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Supreme Court should not have dismissed the complaint as untimely, because the case was properly brought as a plenary action.  Plaintiff chose to assert claims under the New York State and New York City human rights laws, the State Constitution, and the common law, rather than seeking administrative review of the denial of his reasonable accommodation request, as was his right (see Farah v. City of New York, 241 A.D.3d 1435, 1436, 243 N.Y.S.3d 80 [2d Dept. 2025], citing Koerner v. State of N.Y., Pilgrim Psychiatric Ctr., 62 N.Y.2d 442, 446–448, 478 N.Y.S.2d 584, 467 N.E.2d 232 [1984]).  Accordingly, the much shorter statute of limitations for article 78 proceedings did not apply (see Koerner, 62 N.Y.2d at 447, 478 N.Y.S.2d 584, 467 N.E.2d 232).

Nevertheless, the motion court properly dismissed the action because plaintiff failed to state a cause of action.  The City Human Rights Law (HRL) provides:

“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer ․ to impose upon a person as a condition of ․ retaining employment any terms or conditions, compliance with which would require such person to violate ․ such person's creed or religion, ․ and the employer shall make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of such person.”

(Administrative Code of City of New York § 8–107[3][a]).  A reasonable accommodation is “such an accommodation to an employee's ․ religious observance or practice as shall not cause undue hardship in the conduct of the employer's business” (Administrative Code § 8–107[3][b]).  A “determination that no reasonable accommodation would enable the person ․ to satisfy the essential requisites of a job ․ may only be made after the parties have engaged, or the covered entity has attempted to engage, in a cooperative dialogue” (Administrative Code § 8–107[28][e]).

Even under New York's lenient pleading standard, plaintiff's allegations fail to support his claim that defendants unlawfully refused to accommodate his sincerely held religious belief that the COVID–19 vaccine violated his Catholic religious practice, and that they refused to engage in a cooperative dialogue aimed at addressing his religious needs (see Matter of Marsteller v. City of New York, 217 A.D.3d 543, 544, 192 N.Y.S.3d 18 [1st Dept. 2023], appeal dismissed and lv denied 41 N.Y.3d 960, 208 N.Y.S.3d 529, 232 N.E.3d 207 [2024];  see also Farah, 241 A.D.3d at 1437, 243 N.Y.S.3d 80;  Currid v. City of New York, 241 A.D.3d 777, 779, 241 N.Y.S.3d 341 [2d Dept. 2025]).  Plaintiff's bare, conclusory allegation that the requirement that he receive the vaccine undermined the tenet of his faith that he was created in God's image was insufficient to show that he adhered to a bona fide religious practice or doctrine that defendants failed to accommodate (see Cagle v. Weill Cornell Med., 680 F.Supp.3d 428, 435–436 [S.D.N.Y.2023]).  Plaintiff's claim that the City failed to engage in a cooperative dialogue is also unavailing (see Matter of Marsteller, 217 A.D.3d at 544–545, 192 N.Y.S.3d 18).  Further, because plaintiff failed to allege facts showing that defendants discriminated against him under the New York City Human Rights Law or New York State Human Rights Law, his aiding and abetting claims and his claim for attorneys' fees were properly dismissed (see Weir v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 208 A.D.3d 1122, 1123, 175 N.Y.S.3d 498 [1st Dept. 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 911, 2023 WL 3066651 [2023]).

Plaintiff's claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the New York State Constitution also fails, as there is no private right of action to recover damages for state constitutional violations where the alleged wrongs may be redressed by alternative remedies such as the claims under the State and City Human Rights Laws (see Berrio v. City of New York, 212 A.D.3d 569, 569–570, 183 N.Y.S.3d 372 [1st Dept. 2023];  Currid, 241 A.D.3d at 780, 241 N.Y.S.3d 341).

Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fails because public policy bars such a claim against governmental entities (see Melendez v. City of New York, 171 A.D.3d 566, 567, 98 N.Y.S.3d 178 [1st Dept. 2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 914, 2019 WL 4383502 [2019]).  In any event, plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that defendants engaged in “extreme and outrageous conduct [that] intentionally or recklessly cause[d] severe emotional distress to” him (164 Mulberry St. Corp. v. Columbia Univ., 4 A.D.3d 49, 56, 771 N.Y.S.2d 16 [1st Dept. 2004] [internal quotation marks omitted], appeal dismissed 2 N.Y.3d 793, 781 N.Y.S.2d 291, 814 N.E.2d 463 [2004]).  Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief is moot because, the COVID–19 vaccine mandate having been lifted and plaintiff no longer being required to show proof of vaccination, there is no justiciable controversy between the parties (CPLR 3001;  see Big Four LLC v. Bond Street Lofts Condominium, 94 A.D.3d 401, 403, 941 N.Y.S.2d 567 [1st Dept. 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 808, 2012 WL 2428519 [2012];  Currid, 241 A.D.3d at 780, 241 N.Y.S.3d 341).

Finally, the motion court correctly denied plaintiff's cross-motion to amend the complaint, as the allegations in the proposed amended complaint fail to cure the deficiencies raised by defendants in their motion papers (see Meimeteas v. Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, 105 A.D.3d 643, 643, 963 N.Y.S.2d 583 [1st Dept. 2013]).