ALONZO v. RP1185 LLC (2026)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (David B. Cohen, J.), entered on or about September 3, 2024, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240(1) and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the complaint reinstated, defendants' motion denied, to the extent it sought dismissal of the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, and plaintiff's motion granted.

Plaintiff's unrebutted testimony established that he was injured when he was standing approximately 10 feet above the floor on a piece of rebar that shifted or wobbled as his coworkers standing above him were handing him additional rebar to install.  According to plaintiff when the rebar shifted, he dropped a piece of rebar that he was holding, causing it to fall approximately one foot.  Plaintiff allegedly injured his shoulder when he grabbed it in an attempt to prevent it from falling further.

Supreme Court should have denied defendants' motion to the extent that it sought summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action.  Contrary to defendants' assertion otherwise, they are not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff did not fall and was not struck by a falling object (see Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 13 N.Y.3d 599, 604, 895 N.Y.S.2d 279, 922 N.E.2d 865 [2009];  Lopez v. Boston Props., Inc., 41 A.D.3d 259, 259–260, 838 N.Y.S.2d 527 [1st Dept. 2007]).  On the contrary, liability under the statute may be imposed where, as here, a plaintiff can establish that their injury was caused by an attempt to catch something or prevent something from falling further (see Bonaerge v. Leighton House Condominium, 134 A.D.3d 648, 649–650, 22 N.Y.S.3d 52 [1st Dept. 2015];  Kollbeck v. 417 FS Realty LLC, 304 A.D.2d 499, 500, 772 N.Y.S.2d 688 [1st Dept. 2004];  Skow v. Jones, Lang & Wooton Corp., 240 A.D.2d 194, 194–195, 657 N.Y.S.2d 709 [1st Dept. 1997]).  The record establishes that plaintiff was injured in the act of trying to catch a falling piece of rebar, and that his injury may have been prevented had defendants supplied a proper hoist to safely transfer the rebar (see Suwareh v. State of New York, 24 A.D.3d 380, 381, 806 N.Y.S.2d 524 [1st Dept. 2005];  see also Agli v. 21 E. 90 Apts., Corp., 195 A.D.3d 458, 458–459, 149 N.Y.S.3d 72 [1st Dept. 2021]).  According to the evidence submitted, although a crane was sometimes used to transfer heavy rebar at the job site, no crane was available at the time.

Furthermore, defendants failed to establish that that the previously installed rebar, which was the sole platform available for plaintiff to stand on while his coworkers passed him the rebar from above, was stable and safe for plaintiff to be working on at an elevated height (see Macedo v. J.D. Posillico, Inc., 68 A.D.3d 508, 509–510, 891 N.Y.S.2d 46 [1st Dept. 2009]).

It is for these same reasons that Supreme Court should have granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim.  Plaintiff established prima facie that his injury directly flowed from the application of the force of gravity to an object, that he was injured in an effort to prevent the object from falling, and that he was not provided with a proper platform or scaffold (see Ross v. Curtis–Palmer Hydro–Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d 82 [1993];  Lopez, 41 A.D.3d at 260, 838 N.Y.S.2d 527).