VILLARREAL GARZA v. RAMIREZ (2026)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael L. Katz, J.), entered February 10, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiff wife's motion for a protective order and for leave to file a motion to renew and reargue Supreme Court's rulings with respect to the scope of defendant husband's deposition, granted the motion to the extent of directing the husband to pay $25,000 in additional interim counsel fees, and sua sponte directed the wife to file a note of issue on or before February 28, 2025 and to file a copy of the order and a special referee information sheet with the special referee clerk within 10 days of the filing of the note of issue, directed the parties to exchange certain documents for presentation to a special referee, and directed the parties to hold a pretrial conference, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of vacating the interim counsel fee award to the wife of $25,000 and awarding the wife interim counsel fees of $75,000, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Supreme Court properly denied the wife's motion for a protective order under CPLR 3103 directing the husband to appear for a continuation of his deposition.  The motion sought to broaden financial disclosure to include the names of persons with whom the husband had relationships and the nature of those relationships, during the parties’ marriage as well as after.  This motion did not comport with the purpose of a CPLR 3103 protective order — namely, to regulate disclosure for the purpose of preventing abuse and avoiding “unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or other prejudice” (CPLR 3103[a]).  Instead, the wife affirmatively sought to expand the scope of discovery to obtain information going well beyond the bounds the disclosure that would be reasonable to ascertain the husband's finances (see Balsamello v. Structure Tone, Inc., 226 A.D.3d 580, 581, 210 N.Y.S.3d 80 [1st Dept. 2024];  see also Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Marbach, 66 A.D.2d 335, 338–339, 413 N.Y.S.2d 411 [2d Dept. 1979]).  Further, in light of the deference afforded to Supreme Court's discretionary determinations regarding disclosure, we decline to disturb the court's conclusion that lines of inquiry into the husband's dating life were not relevant (see Gumbs v. Flushing Town Center III, LP, 114 A.D.3d 573, 574, 981 N.Y.S.2d 394 [1st Dept. 2014]).  We likewise decline to disturb the court's determination that inquiry into the finances of the husband's mother was neither necessary nor appropriate.

Supreme Court properly found that the wife is the less monied spouse, as she is unemployed while the husband makes in excess of $1 million annually.  She is therefore presumptively entitled to counsel fees under Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) (see O'Shea v. O'Shea, 93 N.Y.2d 187, 190, 689 N.Y.S.2d 8, 711 N.E.2d 193 [1999];  see also Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d 61, 65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667 [2d Dept. 2008]).  Given the parties’ relative financial positions, and given the fact that they have incurred similar amounts of counsel fees, we vacate the counsel fee award of $25,000 and award the wife $75,000 in counsel fees (see e.g. Saunders v. Guberman, 130 A.D.3d 510, 511–512, 14 N.Y.S.3d 334 [1st Dept. 2015]).

Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the wife's motion insofar as it sought leave to renew, as there was no “prior motion” to which the motion was addressed (CPLR 2221[a];  Van Ryn v. Goland, 189 A.D.3d 1749, 1751–1752, 137 N.Y.S.3d 546 [3d Dept. 2020]).  In any event, even if we were to review the court's determination, we would find it to be without merit, as the motion did not point to any “material facts which existed at the time the prior motion was made, but were not then known to the party seeking leave to renew, and, therefore, not made known to the court” (Foley v. Roche, 68 A.D.2d 558, 568, 418 N.Y.S.2d 588 [1st Dept. 1979];  see CPLR 2221[e]).  Moreover, insofar as the wife appeals the denial of her motion for leave to reargue, the appeal is not properly before us, as denial of a motion to reargue is not appealable (see e.g. D'Alessandro v. Carro, 123 A.D.3d 1, 7, 992 N.Y.S.2d 520 [1st Dept. 2014]).

Finally, a motion court is vested with broad discretion to control its calendar (174 Second Equities Corp. v. Hee Nam Bae, 57 A.D.3d 319, 321, 869 N.Y.S.2d 433 [1st Dept. 2008]).  As a result, we see no reason to disturb either Supreme Court's conclusion that the case was ready to proceed to trial or its related directives intended to advance the action toward trial.