IN RE: Katie Maloney WALLACE (2026)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Debra A. James, J.), entered on or about March 24, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from, denied the petition to vacate in part an arbitration award and a supplemental award and granted respondent's cross-motion to confirm the arbitration awards, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner was employed by respondent subject to a written employment agreement containing a mandatory arbitration clause.  Respondent terminated petitioner and shortly thereafter, petitioner commenced the underlying arbitration proceeding alleging gender discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) and unpaid wages under the New York Labor Law. The arbitrator ultimately issued a written award and supplemental award denying petitioner's employment discrimination claim, finding in petitioner's favor on her unpaid wages claim, awarding attorneys’ fees in connection with the wage claim, and denying attorneys’ fees for the discrimination claim.

Petitioner failed to establish any of the limited statutory bases for vacating an arbitration award under CPLR 7511(b).  Petitioner's contention that the arbitrator violated a strong public policy by providing a consolidated written analysis of the discrimination claims applying the shifting burden of persuasion test, in lieu of providing a separate analysis under the NYCHRL's more protective legal standard, is unavailing.  A public policy vacatur requires a showing that the award contravenes a well-defined principle.  Here, the arbitration awards reflect the arbitrator's assessment of credibility, causation, relevant legal principles, and the full evidentiary record (see e.g. New York City Tr. Auth. v. Phillips, 162 A.D.3d 93, 99, 75 N.Y.S.3d 133 [1st Dept. 2018], lv dismissed 31 N.Y.3d 1139, 81 N.Y.S.3d 363, 106 N.E.3d 746 [2018]).

Nor did the arbitrator exceed her power under CPLR 7511 or the Federal Arbitration Act. “[A]n arbitrator exceeds [her] powers only when [she] ignores specific limitations on the powers delegated to [her] in the arbitration clause or [she] gives a completely irrational construction to the provisions of the parties’ agreement, thereby effectively rewriting it” (Fishman v. Roxanne Mgt., 24 A.D.3d 365, 366, 806 N.Y.S.2d 541 [1st Dept. 2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]).  Nothing in the record indicates the arbitrator “effectively rewrote” the parties’ employment agreement.

Petitioner's arguments of “manifest disregard of the law” are similarly unavailing (see Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d 471, 480–481, 813 N.Y.S.2d 691, 846 N.E.2d 1201 [2006];  Matter of Nexia Health Tech., Inc. v. Miratech, Inc., 176 A.D.3d 589, 590–591, 110 N.Y.S.3d 420 [1st Dept. 2019]).  The arbitrator evaluated the evidence and concluded in two written decisions that petitioner failed to meet her burden on her employment discrimination claim under any statutory framework.

Finally, Supreme Court properly upheld the attorneys’ fees determination.  Because petitioner prevailed only on her unpaid wage claim, the arbitrator acted within her discretion in awarding fees limited to that claim.