PEOPLE v. CARTER (2026)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (James M. Burke, J.), rendered April 3, 2019, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, and sentencing her to a three-year conditional discharge, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant failed to preserve her claim that her conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree was based on legally insufficient evidence (see People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 [2008];  People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919 [1995]).  As an alternative holding, we find that the verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007]).

Nor was the verdict against the weight of the evidence (see Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d at 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1;  see also People v. Baque, 43 N.Y.3d 26, 229 N.Y.S.3d 62, 254 N.E.3d 606 [2024]).  There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations (see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987];  People v. Williams, 17 A.D.3d 203, 204, 794 N.Y.S.2d 17 [1st Dept. 2005], lv denied 4 N.Y.3d 892, 798 N.Y.S.2d 737, 831 N.E.2d 982 [2005]).  The fact that the jury acquitted defendant of other charges does not warrant a different conclusion (see People v. Rayam, 94 N.Y.2d 557, 561, 708 N.Y.S.2d 37, 729 N.E.2d 694 [2000]).

The court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground of delay in sentencing.  Notwithstanding our concerns about the court's protracted inquiry into the educational situation of defendant's then-five-year-old son, the delay here was not unreasonable, as it was not excessive and was occasioned by “plausible reasons” that should not trigger a loss of jurisdiction (see People v. Drake, 61 N.Y.2d 359, 366, 474 N.Y.S.2d 276, 462 N.E.2d 376 [1984];  People v. Summers, 80 A.D.3d 520, 914 N.Y.S.2d 634 [1st Dept. 2011], lv denied 16 N.Y.3d 863, 923 N.Y.S.2d 425, 947 N.E.2d 1204 [2011]).  The court adjourned sentencing due to defendant's refusal to provide information requested by the court about her son's living situation and education, which was relevant to sentencing due to the potential impact of the sentence on the welfare of the child.  Thus, it was defendant's actions, not the court's or the People's, that caused the delay (see generally People v. Reyes, 214 A.D.2d 233, 235, 632 N.Y.S.2d 123 [1st Dept. 1995], lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 850, 638 N.Y.S.2d 609, 661 N.E.2d 1391 [1995]).