IN RE: STATE of New York (2025)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Daniel P. Conviser, J.), entered on or about January 31, 2024, which ordered respondent confined in a secure treatment facility as a dangerous sex offender, and bringing up for review an order, same court and Justice, entered on or about August 15, 2023, finding, after a nonjury trial, that respondent is a detained sex offender suffering from a mental abnormality within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law article 10, and an order, same court and Justice, entered on or about January 29, 2024, finding, after a dispositional hearing, that respondent is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The State proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent has a mental abnormality that predisposes him to commit sex offenses and that results in his having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct, as defined by Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03[i];  see Matter of State of New York v. Dennis K., 27 N.Y.3d 718, 743, 37 N.Y.S.3d 765, 59 N.E.3d 500 [2016], cert denied 580 U.S. 1023, 137 S.Ct. 579, 196 L.Ed.2d 452 [2016];  Matter of State of New York v. Richard V., 228 A.D.3d 109, 118, 210 N.Y.S.3d 52 [1st Dept. 2024]).  The State experts, among other things, credibly linked respondent's combined diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder and two substance use disorders (which were in remission during his confinement) to his predisposition to commit sex crimes and his serious difficulty in controlling his sex-offending behavior (cf.  Matter of State of New York v. A.A., 238 A.D.3d 651, 652, 236 N.Y.S.3d 27 [1st Dept. 2025];  Matter of State of New York v. David D., 206 A.D.3d 481, 485, 169 N.Y.S.3d 312 [1st Dept. 2022];  see also Matter of State of New York v. Langston F., 236 A.D.3d 915, 917, 229 N.Y.S.3d 594 [2d Dept. 2025], lv denied 44 N.Y.3d 903, 2025 WL 2646925 [2025]).

Contrary to respondent's argument, we find that that these disorders, in combination, may provide the foundation for the mental abnormality finding where, as here, the experts testified that respondent's antisocial traits, including cognitive distortions, aggression, and impulsivity lead him, as evidenced by his extensive history of sex offending conduct, to seek sexual gratification without regard for the rules of society or the rights of others.  Moreover, it shows that he suffers from a substance use disorder that simultaneously increases his sexual desire and removes the inhibitions that might otherwise prevent him from committing sex offenses.

Respondent's reliance on Matter of State of New York v. George N., 160 A.D.3d 28, 70 N.Y.S.3d 699 (4th Dept. 2018) is misplaced.  That case found that a respondent's nonsexual misconduct consisting of the use of alcohol or drugs while on strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST) could not satisfy the State's obligation to prove the “inability” to control his sexual conduct required to revoke SIST in favor of secure confinement.  It did not address whether an article 10 mental abnormality can be established based on expert testimony regarding the combination of a diagnosed substance use disorder and antisocial personality disorder, along with other considerations relevant to respondent's detailed psychological portrait.

Clear and convincing evidence also supports the finding that the mental abnormality from which respondent suffers involves such a strong predisposition to commit sex offenses and such an inability to control his behavior that he is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if he is not confined to a secure treatment facility (see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07[f];  David D., 206 A.D.3d at 485–486, 169 N.Y.S.3d 312).  There is no valid basis to disturb the court's determination to credit the testimony of the State's experts to this effect (see Matter of State of New York v. Kerry K., 222 A.D.3d 655, 659, 202 N.Y.S.3d 166 [2d Dept. 2023], appeal dismissed 41 N.Y.3d 1012, 213 N.Y.S.3d 756, 237 N.E.3d 822 [2024], lv denied 42 N.Y.3d 910, 2024 WL 5127249 [2024]).