PEOPLE v. MANLEY (2025)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Abraham L. Clott, J.), rendered October 19, 2022, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of attempted assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to concurrent terms of 12 years and 7 years, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant was charged with assaulting a man outside a men's shelter in Manhattan.  During jury selection, the court instructed the prospective jurors as to the location and the nature of the incident.  When answering the court's initial questionnaire, prospective juror number four indicated that he had attended school in the neighborhood where the incident occurred.  Later in the day, prospective juror number four alerted a court officer that he recognized defendant from the neighborhood around the shelter.  The court noticed the conversation while questioning other potential jurors, paused the questioning, and asked the officer to approach and explain the nature of the conversation.  The court then dismissed prospective juror number four.

Defendant's claim on appeal that the court impermissibly delegated its authority to the court officer is unpreserved (CPL 470.05[2]).  Further, there was no improper delegation of judicial authority when the court excused the prospective juror.  Accordingly, there was no mode of proceedings error exempt from preservation requirements (see People v. Agramonte, 87 N.Y.2d 765, 770, 642 N.Y.S.2d 594, 665 N.E.2d 164 [1996] [explaining that a mode of proceedings error is a narrow exception to the preservation requirement reserved for “[o]nly fundamental defects in judicial proceedings”]).

In relaying a message received from a prospective juror to the court, the court officer was fundamentally performing a ministerial function (see People v. Williams, 21 N.Y.3d 932, 935, 969 N.Y.S.2d 421, 991 N.E.2d 195 [2013]).  The court did not relinquish supervision or control of the proceedings, and the court officer did not inquire into the prospective juror's fitness at the direction of the court.  The court officer merely communicated an issue raised by a prospective juror to the court, which “made its own determination” about the proper course of action (see e.g. People v. Singletary, 66 A.D.3d 564, 566, 887 N.Y.S.2d 86 [1st Dept. 2009], lv denied 13 N.Y.3d 941, 895 N.Y.S.2d 332, 922 N.E.2d 921 [2010]).  This does not amount to an “improper delegation of supervisory authority” to the court officer, who was essentially serving as a messenger (People v. Bartlett, 160 A.D.2d 245, 246, 553 N.Y.S.2d 336 [1st Dept. 1990], lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 852, 560 N.Y.S.2d 992, 561 N.E.2d 892 [1990]).

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.