KLAPAN v. TULLY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT (2025)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted in its entirety, and the complaint is dismissed.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action alleging employment discrimination by defendant. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court granted the motion in part and dismissed a disability discrimination claim and a retaliation cause of action, but denied that part of the motion seeking dismissal of a sex discrimination claim. Defendant appeals.

Plaintiffs alleging discrimination in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law must show “(1) [they] are a member of a protected class; (2) [they were] qualified to hold the position; (3) [they were] terminated from employment or suffered another adverse employment action; and (4) the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination” (Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 305, 786 N.Y.S.2d 382, 819 N.E.2d 998 [2004]). A defendant moving for summary judgment dismissing a discrimination cause of action “must demonstrate either the plaintiff's failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged action, the absence of triable issue[s] of fact as to whether the explanations were pretextual” (Lefort v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 203 A.D.3d 708, 710, 164 N.Y.S.3d 183 [2d Dept. 2022] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Thygesen v. North Bailey Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 151 A.D.3d 1708, 1709, 57 N.Y.S.3d 582 [4th Dept. 2017]).

Contrary to defendant's contention, the court properly determined that defendant did not meet its burden with respect to plaintiff's alleged failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination (see Thygesen, 151 A.D.3d at 1709, 57 N.Y.S.3d 582). We note that plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case is “ ‘de minimis’ ” (Basso v. Earthlink, Inc., 157 A.D.3d 428, 429, 69 N.Y.S.3d 8 [1st Dept. 2018]; see Matter of Hirsch v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 232 A.D.3d 1248, 1250-1251, 221 N.Y.S.3d 383 [4th Dept. 2024]). We agree with defendant, however, and the court properly determined, that defendant established that there were legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its employment determination, and plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact (see Thygesen, 151 A.D.3d at 1709, 57 N.Y.S.3d 582; Clark v. Morelli Ratner PC, 73 A.D.3d 591, 591-592, 905 N.Y.S.2d 561 [1st Dept. 2010]). In particular, the evidence established that there were at least three incidents during plaintiff's one-year probationary term where plaintiff exercised poor judgment.

We further agree with defendant that it established “the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether [its] explanations were pretextual” (Forrest, 3 N.Y.3d at 305, 786 N.Y.S.2d 382, 819 N.E.2d 998), and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue that defendant's reasons “were false and that [gender-] motivated discrimination was the real reason” for defendant's employment determination (id. at 308, 786 N.Y.S.2d 382, 819 N.E.2d 998). We therefore reverse the order insofar as appealed from, grant the motion in its entirety and dismiss the complaint.