DOE v. KIPP NEW YORK INC (2025)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lisa S. Headley, J.), entered May 7, 2024, which denied plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed under the pseudonym “Jane Doe,” unanimously reversed, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, without costs and the motion granted.

Although the better course would have been for plaintiff to submit all supporting evidence with her initial moving papers, we exercise our discretion to consider plaintiff's affidavit even though it was submitted for the first time on reply.

As to the merits, Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff's request to proceed in this litigation under the pseudonym “Jane Doe” (see Anonymous v. Lerner, 124 A.D.3d 487, 487, 998 N.Y.S.2d 619 [1st Dept. 2015];  Doe v. Khandker, 221 A.D.3d 782, 782–783, 200 N.Y.S.3d 385 [2d Dept. 2023]).  This action concerns information of a highly sensitive, intimate, and personal nature — namely, a video depicting plaintiff masturbating.  Plaintiff's affidavit establishes the serious psychological harm that disclosure of her role in this video caused her and would continue to cause her, as well as the potential impact on her career in education (see Doe v. Bloomberg L.P., 200 A.D.3d 410, 410, 154 N.Y.S.3d 766 [1st Dept. 2021];  Roe v. Harborfields Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 A.D.3d 853, 855, 182 N.Y.S.3d 232 [2d Dept. 2023];  PB–7 Doe v. Amherst Cent. Sch. Dist., 196 A.D.3d 9, 14, 148 N.Y.S.3d 305 [4th Dept. 2021]).  That plaintiff was able to obtain a new job in education after her termination by defendants is of no moment, as she may still need to apply for other jobs in future and it is not clear whether her current employer is aware of the circumstances of her termination.

Defendants do not identify any source of prejudice to them from allowing plaintiff to proceed by pseudonym, as they know who she is and therefore are not impeded in mounting a defense (see N.S. v. Frankenhoff, 215 A.D.3d 592, 593, 189 N.Y.S.3d 79 [1st Dept. 2023];  Bloomberg, 200 A.D.3d at 410, 154 N.Y.S.3d 766;  Harborfields, 212 A.D.3d at 855–56, 182 N.Y.S.3d 232).  The public interest in disclosure of plaintiff's identity is also minimal.  Even if the charter school defendants were deemed public entities for these purposes (see Education Law § 2854[3][a], [c];  New York Charter School Assn. v. Smith, 15 N.Y.3d 403, 409–410, 914 N.Y.S.2d 696, 940 N.E.2d 522 [2010]), that fact would not be dispositive, especially because plaintiff is not requesting that court records be sealed or public access denied (see e.g. Harborfields, 212 A.D.3d at 855–856, 182 N.Y.S.3d 232;  Amherst, 196 A.D.3d at 14–15, 148 N.Y.S.3d 305;  see also Yeshiva Univ., 195 A.D.3d at 566, 146 N.Y.S.3d 482).  Furthermore, the termination decision at issue here is not claimed to be the result of any government policy.

Plaintiff's privacy interest outweighs the reputational interest of the individual defendants’ anonymity (see Lerner, 124 A.D.3d at 487, 998 N.Y.S.2d 619;  Amherst, 196 A.D.3d at 13–15, 148 N.Y.S.3d 305).