THUKU v. 324 93 LLC (2025)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Adam Silvera, J.), entered September 23, 2024, which, after a hearing for the judicial determination of the apportionment of legal fees, apportioned 15% of the net contingency fee to outgoing counsel nonparty-respondent The Law Office of Michael Lamonsoff (Lamonsoff), and apportioned 85% to incoming counsel nonparty-appellant Jaroslawicz & Jaros PLLC (J & J), unanimously modified, on the facts, to reduce the apportionment of the net contingency fee to Lamonsoff to 5% and increase the apportionment to J & J to 95%, and otherwise affirmed, without costs

It has not been established that Lamonsoff was discharged for cause so as to warrant a forfeiture of the fee.  Therefore, Lamonsoff is entitled to an apportionment of the legal fee for the work it performed (see Wiggins v. Kopko, 105 A.D.3d 1132, 1134, 962 N.Y.S.2d 776 [3d Dept. 2013]).

Lamonsoff worked on plaintiff's behalf for approximately one-and-a-half years.  During that time, Lamonsoff obtained letters of administration, commenced the action via summons and a seven-page complaint, amended the complaint to add additional defendants, filed the RJI, and attended court conferences.  During that time, Lamonsoff failed to comply with one of the defendant's discovery demands and violated court orders, resulting in unnecessary motion practice that was ultimately handled by incoming counsel J & J. In contrast, the record shows that J & J performed significantly more work during its five-year representation of plaintiff.  Specifically, J & J opposed a motion to strike the complaint caused by Lamonsoff's failure to provide discovery, stipulated to a change of venue, responded to and conducted extensive discovery, prepared for and attended numerous depositions, retained experts, opposed and moved for summary judgment, prepared for trial, and secured a satisfactory settlement offer on the eve of trial.  Accordingly, we modify the apportionment of the attorney's fee to the extent indicated (see Han Soo Lee v. Riverhead Bay Motors, 110 A.D.3d 436, 436–437, 972 N.Y.S.2d 240 [1st Dept. 2013];  Shabazz v. City of New York, 94 A.D.3d 569, 569, 942 N.Y.S.2d 89 [1st Dept. 2012];  see also Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 73 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 541 N.Y.S.2d 742, 539 N.E.2d 570 [1989]).