IN RE: T.Z. (2025)

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Erin E. Browne, R.), entered on or about February 6, 2024, which, upon a finding that respondent had engaged in the family offense of harassment in the second degree, granted petitioner a two-year order of protection, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that respondent's actions constituted the family offense of harassment in the second degree (see Family Ct Act § 832;  Penal Law § 240.26[3];  Matter of Everett C. v. Oneida P., 61 A.D.3d 489, 489, 878 N.Y.S.2d 301 [1st Dept. 2009]).  Respondent's actions, which included going to petitioner's home and workplace to threaten his life, served no legitimate purpose and established a course of conduct that was undertaken with the intent of seriously annoying or alarming petitioner (see Matter of Anthony B. v. Judy M., 167 A.D.3d 476, 476, 87 N.Y.S.3d 883 [1st Dept. 2018]).

We reject respondent's argument that she was denied access to a fair trial because she was forced to proceed pro se.  As the record shows, not only did Family Court advise her of her right to an attorney, but also assigned her two different attorneys, both of whom were ultimately relieved from representation (see Matter of Angela C. v. Harris K., 102 A.D.3d 588, 589, 959 N.Y.S.2d 45 [1st Dept. 2013]).  Respondent consented to her assigned counsel being relieved, informed the court that she intended to obtain her own counsel, and was granted two adjournments and several months to find new counsel before the final hearing (see e.g. Matter of Emma L., 35 A.D.3d 250, 252, 826 N.Y.S.2d 52 [1st Dept. 2006], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 8 N.Y.3d 904, 834 N.Y.S.2d 76, 865 N.E.2d 1242 [2007]).  Furthermore, contrary to respondent's assertion otherwise, she was given adequate opportunity to cross-examine petitioner and undermine his credibility (see Matter of Anthony K., 11 A.D.3d 748, 750, 783 N.Y.S.2d 418 [3d Dept. 2004]).