PEOPLE v. MATEO (2025)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ellen Biben, J.), rendered February 10, 2021, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of robbery in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of 31/212 years, unanimously modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, to the extent of vacating the surcharge and fees imposed on defendant at sentencing, and otherwise affirmed.

The court providently exercised its discretion in denying youthful offender treatment (see generally People v. Drayton, 39 N.Y.2d 580, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1, 350 N.E.2d 377 [1976]), given the seriousness of the underlying crime, in which defendant acted in concert with others to rob and beat the victim (see People v. Redwood, 41 A.D.3d 275, 276, 838 N.Y.S.2d 66 [1st Dept. 2007], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 880, 842 N.Y.S.2d 792, 874 N.E.2d 759 [2007]).  Further, defendant failed to comply with the conditions of his plea agreement, and was rearrested and indicted for attempted murder and related charges, which were pending at the time of sentencing (see People v. Roberts, 228 A.D.3d 488, 489, 211 N.Y.S.3d 80 [1st Dept. 2024], lv denied 42 N.Y.3d 1054, 225 N.Y.S.3d 658, 250 N.E.3d 669 [2024];  People v. Tyson, 144 A.D.3d 441, 39 N.Y.S.3d 785 [1st Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1189, 52 N.Y.S.3d 716, 75 N.E.3d 108 [2017]).  We perceive no basis to substitute a youthful offender adjudication in the interest of justice.

Based on our interest of justice powers, we vacate the surcharge and fees imposed on defendant at sentencing (see People v. Chirinos, 190 A.D.3d 434, 135 N.Y.S.3d 641 [1st Dept. 2021]).  We note that the People do not oppose this relief.