Y.C., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. City of New York, et al., Defendants. (2025)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Laurence L. Love, J.), entered on or about April 14, 2023, which granted defendant Catholic Charities of Staten Island's motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

It is undisputed that plaintiff served Catholic Charities of Staten Island (CCSI), formerly known as Mission of the Immaculate Virgin, with a summons and amended complaint after the expiration of the two-year window in which to file Child Victims Act claims.

Supreme Court properly granted CCSI's motion to dismiss the amended complaint as time-barred because the relation-back doctrine does not save the amended complaint, nor can plaintiff satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of CPLR 1024.  Plaintiff cannot show that the City of New York, an original defendant, and CCSI were united in interest (see Sew Wai Yong v. City of New York, 41 A.D.3d 212, 213, 841 N.Y.S.2d 3 [1st Dept. 2007]).  Plaintiff's contention that the City and CCSI were engaged in an agency relationship for purposes of plaintiff's foster care placement is not supported by evidence (see Brunero v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Parks & Recreation, 121 A.D.3d 624, 626, 995 N.Y.S.2d 569 [1st Dept. 2014];  Falletta v. Norman, 220 A.D.3d 1207, 1209–1210, 197 N.Y.S.3d 799 [4th Dept. 2023]).  Furthermore, mere speculation is insufficient to establish unity of interest (see Regina v. Broadway–Bronx Motel Co., 23 A.D.3d 255, 255, 804 N.Y.S.2d 305 [1st Dept. 2005]).

Even if the City and CCSI were both involved in plaintiff's placement, unity of interest would not necessarily follow because both entities have divergent interests in the litigation and may assert different defenses (see Connell v. Hayden, 83 A.D.2d 30, 45, 443 N.Y.S.2d 383 [2d Dept. 1981]).  Plaintiff also failed to show that CCSI would not be prejudiced by her delay in adding it to this lawsuit, as it is entitled to adequate notice of claims against it to prepare a defense and conduct its own investigation of this more than 50–year–old claim (see Brock v. Bua, 83 A.D.2d 61, 64, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407 [2d Dept. 1981]).

Further, with diligence, plaintiff could have or should have known the identity of the intended defendant before she sought to add CCSI to the action, and her failure to name it earlier cannot be characterized as a mistake for relation-back purposes (see Goldberg v. Boatmax://, Inc., 41 A.D.3d 255, 256, 840 N.Y.S.2d 570 [1st Dept. 2007]).  Moreover, the description in the initial complaint of the “Doe” defendants was insufficient to place CCSI on notice that it was a target of plaintiff's claims (see id.).

Plaintiff also did not satisfy the requirements of CPLR 1024 because she did not demonstrate that, other than speaking with her attorneys, she diligently sought to identify the unknown entity involved in her foster care placement before the statute of limitations expired (see Opiela v. May Indus. Corp., 10 A.D.3d 340, 341, 781 N.Y.S.2d 353 [1st Dept. 2004];  Holmes v. City of New York, 132 A.D.3d 952, 954, 18 N.Y.S.3d 676 [2d Dept. 2015]).  Nor did plaintiff promptly seek disclosure from the City or nonparty The New York Foundling or follow up on her initial letter requests for disclosure (see Temple v. New York Community Hosp. of Brooklyn, 89 A.D.3d 926, 928, 933 N.Y.S.2d 321 [2d Dept. 2011]).  Even when plaintiff first learned that New York Foundling was not involved in her foster care placement, she delayed an additional eight months to move to extend time to serve process on CCSI and to amend the complaint and the caption (see Brook v. Peconic Bay Med. Ctr., 172 A.D.3d 468, 469, 102 N.Y.S.3d 1 [1st Dept. 2019]).

Lastly, the allegations in the original complaint, filed pseudonymously, were insufficient to fairly advise CCSI that it was the intended defendant of plaintiff's lawsuit (see Opiela, 10 A.D.3d at 341, 781 N.Y.S.2d 353).

We have considered plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.