PEOPLE v. BAEZ (2025)

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gilbert C. Hong, J.), rendered October 15, 2019, convicting defendant, following a jury trial, of arson in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate term of 15 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant explicitly waived his right to be present at trial (see People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 136, 140–141, 454 N.Y.S.2d 967, 440 N.E.2d 1313 [1982];  People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343, 349–350, 372 N.Y.S.2d 606, 334 N.E.2d 566 [1975], cert denied 423 U.S. 999, 96 S.Ct. 430, 46 L.Ed.2d 374 [1975]) when he was unable to attend the proceedings on one afternoon due to illness.  A valid explicit waiver of the right to be present “occurs when a defendant either personally or through his counsel makes an affirmative statement on the record to the effect that he is waiving [his] right to be present” (People v. Girard, 211 A.D.3d 148, 153, 178 N.Y.S.3d 54 [1st Dept. 2022]), which defendant did on the date in question.

The evidence that defendant was the person who set fire to his ex-girlfriend's apartment door was legally sufficient, and overwhelming, and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007];  see also People v. Baque, ––– N.Y.3d ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 05244 [2024]).

We perceive no basis for reducing defendant's sentence.