IN RE: A.E.H.L. (2025)

Orders, Family Court, Bronx County (Karen M.C. Cortes, J.), entered on or about May 1, 2024, which, insofar as appealed from, upon a finding of permanent neglect, terminated respondent father's parental rights as to the subject children A.E.H.L, A.K.H.L, and M.A.H.L., and transferred custody of the children to petitioner agency and the Commissioner of the Administration for Children's Services (ACS) for the purposes of adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs.  Appeal from order, same court and Judge, entered on or about May 1, 2024, which, after a fact-finding hearing, held that respondent was not entitled to notice before freeing the child J.C.H.L. for adoption, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as respondent fails to challenge Family Court's determination that respondent is not a consent father.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the finding that the father permanently neglected the elder children (Social Services Law § 384–b[7][a], [f]).  Contrary to the father's contention, the record supports Family Court's determination that the agency made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen his relationship with the children, including referring the father to anger management, domestic violence, parenting skills classes, and scheduling regular visits with the children (see Matter of Julianna Victoria S. [Benny William W.], 89 A.D.3d 490, 491, 934 N.Y.S.2d 91 [1st Dept. 2011], lv denied 18 N.Y.3d 805, 2012 WL 400041 [2012]).  Despite these diligent efforts, during the relevant statutory period, the father only completed his parenting class, partially completed his anger management class, and failed to consistently visit the children, doing so only five times in more than a year (see Matter of Zariah M.E. [Alexys T.], 171 A.D.3d 607, 608, 96 N.Y.S.3d 855 [1st Dept. 2019]).  The father also failed to plan for the children's future by obtaining suitable housing, only agreeing to do so in the event the children were returned to him.  Nor did the father plan for the children's future by making efforts to understand and gain insight into their special needs, of which the agency informed him.

A preponderance of the evidence supports Family Court's determination that it was in the children's best interests to terminate the father's parental rights with respect to the three elder children and free them for adoption (see Matter of Raul R. [III] [Raul R.—Cinthia R.], 199 A.D.3d 594, 595, 158 N.Y.S.3d 87 [1st Dept. 2021], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 944, 165 N.Y.S.3d 30, 185 N.E.3d 512 [2022]).  The father failed to raise any arguments on appeal with respect to Family Court's determination that no party was entitled to notice of the adoption of the youngest child, rendering those arguments abandoned, and the appeal from that dispositional order dismissed (see e.g. Matter of Spencer Isaiah R. [Spencer R.], 78 A.D.3d 561, 911 N.Y.S.2d 351 [1st Dept. 2010]).  In any event, the father failed to establish that he would be able to care for the children on a permanent basis.  The father testified to having only vague plans to arrange his work schedule to manage their care and to secure adequate housing at some future point, and he took no steps to understand his children's special needs (Matter of Raul R. III, 199 A.D.3d at 595, 158 N.Y.S.3d 87).  The evidence also established that a suspended judgment was not warranted where, as here, the children have been living for years in their foster homes where their needs are being met, and both foster mothers are pursuing adoption (see Matter of Angelica D. [Deborah D.], 157 A.D.3d 587, 588, 69 N.Y.S.3d 312 [1st Dept. 2018]).