IN RE: OVED & OVED LLP (2024)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lyle E. Frank, J.), entered on or about March 8, 2024, which denied the petition for disclosure to aid in bringing an action under CPLR 3102(c) and granted the cross-motion to dismiss the petition, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Pre-action discovery was properly denied.  Petitioner failed to demonstrate that it had a meritorious defamation claim (see generally CPLR 3102[c];  Matter of Uddin v. New York City Tr. Auth., 27 A.D.3d 265, 266, 810 N.Y.S.2d 198 [1st Dept. 2006]) because the alleged defamatory statements are nonactionable statements of pure opinion (see generally Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262, 269–270, 998 N.Y.S.2d 131, 22 N.E.3d 999 [2014]).

The statement that petitioner “has rude attorney's [sic]” does not have a precise meaning that is capable of being proven true or false, as what is rude to one person may not be perceived as rude to another (see Morrison v. Poullet, 227 A.D.2d 599, 599, 643 N.Y.S.2d 185 [2d Dept. 1996];  Hakimi v. Guidant Global, 2023 WL 8005321, *8, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207954, *25 [S.D.N.Y., Nov. 17, 2023, 22 Civ. 8765(KPF)];  Romeo & Juliette Laser Hair Removal, Inc. v. Assara I LLC, 2016 WL 815205, *2, *8, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24850, *7, *23, 2 [S.D.N.Y., Feb. 29, 2016, 08cv0442(DLC)], affd 679 Fed.Appx.33 [2d Cir. 2017];  see also generally Goldfarb v. Channel One Russia, 663 F.Supp.3d 280, 303 [S.D.N.Y.2023]).

It is not clear what the statement that petitioner has “high amounts of censorship” was intended to convey.  It is not clear how a private law firm could engage in censorship, even as that term is used colloquially.  We reject petitioner's suggestion that the statement implies that it engaged in conduct in violation of its ethical obligations under Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) rules 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, and 8.4.  These rules involve the concealment of one's own documents or information, not the suppression of documents or speech by others, which is the essence of censorship.  If the statement means anything at all, it is the type of “[l] oose, figurative or hyperbolic statement[ ]” that is not actionable, “even if deprecating the plaintiff” (Dillon v. City of N.Y., 261 A.D.2d 34, 38, 704 N.Y.S.2d 1 [1st Dept. 1999]).

The statements also do not imply knowledge of undisclosed facts, as required to constitute statements of mixed opinion (see generally Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d at 269, 998 N.Y.S.2d 131, 22 N.E.3d 999).

We have considered the remaining arguments and find them unavailing.