BURGOS v. The New York City Transit Authority, et al., Defendants. (2024)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Machelle Sweeting, J.), entered on or about December 23, 2021, which granted defendants Diamond Bricks, Inc. and Codou Thiam's (collectively defendants) motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on plaintiff's inability to demonstrate that she sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d), unanimously modified, on the law, to deny the motion with respect to plaintiff's claims of serious injury involving “significant” and “permanent” limitations of use of her cervical spine, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Defendants established prima facie that plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury by submitting the medical report of their orthopedic surgery expert, who found normal ranges of motion in plaintiff's cervical spine, lumbar spine, and right knee with no evidence of tenderness or other abnormality (see Peart v. Carreras, 227 A.D.3d 479, 479, 211 N.Y.S.3d 34 [1st Dept. 2024];  Stickney v. Akhar, 187 A.D.3d 425, 425, 132 N.Y.S.3d 120 [1st Dept. 2020]).  Defendants’ radiology expert concluded that there was no evidence of acute spinal injury and that any injuries were degenerative in nature and not causally related to the accident (see Diakite v. PSAJA Corp., 173 A.D.3d 535, 536, 102 N.Y.S.3d 588 [1st Dept. 2019]).  In addition, defendants submitted evidence that plaintiff previously injured her lumbar spine and knees in a trip-and-fall accident pre-dating the July 2014 motor vehicle accident.  Contrary to plaintiff's contentions, the medical report of the City Transit defendants’ expert, which she submitted in opposition to defendants’ motion, has no bearing on whether defendants met their burden (see e.g. Perl v. Meher, 18 N.Y.3d 208, 936 N.Y.S.2d 655, 960 N.E.2d 424 [2011]).  In any event, his observations are not so inconsistent with the findings of defendants’ medical experts (see e.g. Biascochea v. Boves, 93 A.D.3d 548, 548, 940 N.Y.S.2d 599 [1st Dept. 2012]).

Regarding her claimed lumbar spine and right knee injuries, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue, as her physicians failed to sufficiently show that her limitations stemmed from the accident rather than her preexisting injuries (see Rodriguez v. Morel, 201 A.D.3d 606, 606–607, 157 N.Y.S.3d 725 [1st Dept. 2022];  Antepara v. Garcia, 194 A.D.3d 513, 514, 148 N.Y.S.3d 451 [1st Dept. 2021]).  Her medical expert's conclusory opinion that these injuries were exacerbated by the accident is speculative, as he acknowledged that he did not review any medical records predating the accident (see Russell v. Cornell Univ., 110 A.D.3d 1236, 1237–1238, 973 N.Y.S.2d 407 [1st Dept. 2013]).

However, plaintiff raised a triable issue as to her cervical spine injury, as her physicians found reduced range of motion in all planes and other positive findings shortly after the accident, as well as two years later (see Keri v. Beye, 223 A.D.3d 432, 433, 203 N.Y.S.3d 29 [1st Dept. 2024];  Vera v. Islam, 70 A.D.3d 525, 895 N.Y.S.2d 73 [1st Dept. 2010]).  Unlike her other claimed injuries, plaintiff's testimony and her medical records reflect that she had not injured her cervical spine prior to the July 2014 accident.  Further, given that there is no indication of degenerative conditions of the cervical spine in plaintiff's own medical records and MRIs, plaintiff's physician adequately addressed the issue and opined that the injuries were causally related to the motor vehicle accident (see Holloman v. American United Transp. Inc., 162 A.D.3d 423, 424, 75 N.Y.S.3d 26 [1st Dept. 2018];  Yuen v. Arka Memory Cab Corp., 80 A.D.3d 481, 482, 915 N.Y.S.2d 529 [1st Dept. 2011]).  While defendants point to a period in which plaintiff was not receiving treatment, she received consistent treatment for about two years following the accident, and the record overall raises an issue of fact as to whether the cervical spine injury is permanent.  Even if the injury is found to be nonpermanent, plaintiff may recover if she sustained a “significant” limitation of use injury (see Arias v. Martinez, 176 A.D.3d 548, 549, 112 N.Y.S.3d 18 [1st Dept. 2019];  see generally Vasquez v. Almanzar, 107 A.D.3d 538, 539, 967 N.Y.S.2d 361 [1st Dept. 2013]).

Plaintiff's 90/180-day claim was properly dismissed, as she failed to rebut defendants’ showing that she was not seriously curtailed from performing her usual activities for 90 out of the next 180 days (see Morris v. Ilya Cab Corp., 61 A.D.3d 434, 435, 876 N.Y.S.2d 61 [1st Dept. 2009])