PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ (2005)

 On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, attempted assault on a police officer (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.08) and aggravated harassment in the second degree (§ 240.30[1] ), defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress “everything that followed” his warrantless arrest.   We reject that contention.   The record establishes that defendant was arrested after stepping out of his house onto the front porch of his house and, contrary to the contention of defendant, his warrantless arrest outside his house or at the threshold thereof did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights (see People v. Reynoso, 2 N.Y.3d 820, 821, 781 N.Y.S.2d 284, 814 N.E.2d 456;  People v. Brown, 13 A.D.3d 1194, 1195, 786 N.Y.S.2d 781, lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 828, 796 N.Y.S.2d 583, 829 N.E.2d 676;  see also People v. Roe, 73 N.Y.2d 1004, 1006, 541 N.Y.S.2d 759, 539 N.E.2d 587).   Also contrary to defendant's contention, the police had probable cause for the arrest based on the formal criminal complaint of defendant's wife (see People v. Alston, 59 A.D.2d 766, 398 N.Y.S.2d 717;  see also People v. Soto, 279 A.D.2d 592, 719 N.Y.S.2d 603, lv. denied 96 N.Y.2d 788, 725 N.Y.S.2d 652, 749 N.E.2d 221).

 We further conclude that the court properly refused to preclude evidence of a certain statement of defendant that was not set forth in the CPL 710.30 notice.   The court conducted a suppression hearing at which defendant had a full opportunity to be heard concerning the voluntariness of the statement (see CPL 710.30[3];  People v. Morris, 248 A.D.2d 169, 170, 670 N.Y.S.2d 828, affd. 93 N.Y.2d 908, 690 N.Y.S.2d 510, 712 N.E.2d 676;  People v. Rivera, 306 A.D.2d 186, 187, 761 N.Y.S.2d 217, lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 598, 766 N.Y.S.2d 174, 798 N.E.2d 358;  People v. Garcia, 290 A.D.2d 299, 300, 735 N.Y.S.2d 545, lv. denied 98 N.Y.2d 730, 749 N.Y.S.2d 480, 779 N.E.2d 191).

 By failing to object to the court's ultimate Sandoval ruling, defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion (see People v. O'Connor, 19 A.D.3d 1154, 795 N.Y.S.2d 917;  People v. Brown, 16 A.D.3d 1102, 1103, 790 N.Y.S.2d 912;  People v. Englert, 285 A.D.2d 987, 727 N.Y.S.2d 680, lv. denied 97 N.Y.2d 655, 737 N.Y.S.2d 56, 762 N.E.2d 934).   In any event, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting cross-examination of defendant concerning the fact that he previously was convicted of sexual abuse while precluding any inquiry into the underlying facts (see People v. Hayes, 97 N.Y.2d 203, 208, 738 N.Y.S.2d 663, 764 N.E.2d 963;  People v. Walker, 83 N.Y.2d 455, 458-459, 611 N.Y.S.2d 118, 633 N.E.2d 472;  see generally People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458, 451 N.E.2d 216).

The evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction of attempted assault on a police officer and aggravated harassment in the second degree, and the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence with respect to those counts (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).   Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: