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The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Rafael E. QUIROGA-PUMA, Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Justice Court of the Village of Westbury, Nassau County (Thomas F. Liotti, J.), dated December 20, 2007. The order, sua sponte, dismissed the accusatory instrument (see 18 Misc.3d 731, 848 N.Y.S.2d 853 [2007] ).
Order reversed, on the law, accusatory instrument reinstated, and matter remitted to the Justice Court for all further proceedings thereon.
After defendant was charged with unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509[1] ), the Justice Court, sua sponte, dismissed the accusatory instrument on the ground that Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 502(1) and 509(1), insofar as they require identity documentation as a condition of the issuance of a driver's license, are unconstitutional as applied to defendant. The court reasoned that because defendant, a non-citizen and “presumably here illegally,” cannot satisfy the identification requirements promulgated by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, the requirements deny defendant a property right necessary to his economic well-being and violate defendant's rights under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses, as well as the Tenth Amendment. The People appeal and we reverse.
While a person may generally challenge the constitutionality of a statute he or she is alleged to have violated (People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 255, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006] ), and a driver's license is “a substantial property interest that may not be deprived [or withheld] without due process of law” (Pringle v. Wolfe, 88 N.Y.2d 426, 431, 646 N.Y.S.2d 82, 668 N.E.2d 1376 [1996], citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 [1971] ), the constitutional issues raised in the order were not properly before the Justice Court.
The Justice Court should not have raised the constitutional issues, sua sponte, in the absence of evidence showing that this defendant has standing to advance the complaints raised on his behalf by the court. The record does not contain any indication that defendant is an undocumented alien. Further, the record does not indicate that defendant ever applied for a driver's license and, even assuming that he did apply and was denied a license, that the grounds for the denial were unrelated to age, the ability to pass the visual, written and performance test requirements (see generally Vehicle and Traffic Law § 502[1]-[4]; Regulations of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles [15 NYCRR] §§ 3.3-5.10), or some other civil or physical impediment to obtaining a license that is unrelated to the constitutional issues herein raised, much less that the denial was, in fact, based on his failure to produce the required documentation. “It is axiomatic that there is no standing to complain where an alleged defect in or violation of a statute does not injure the party seeking redress” (Matter of Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223, 240, 496 N.Y.S.2d 384, 487 N.E.2d 241 [1985] ), and “[a]s a general rule, if there is no constitutional defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, he does not have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypothetical situations” (County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 155, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 [1979]; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 [1992] ). “Standing goes to the jurisdictional basis of a court's authority to adjudicate a dispute” (Stark v. Goldberg, 297 A.D.2d 203, 204, 746 N.Y.S.2d 280 [2002], quoting Matter of Eaton Assoc. v. Egan, 142 A.D.2d 330, 334-335, 535 N.Y.S.2d 998 [1988] ).
Additionally, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant had standing to raise the constitutional issues, the Justice Court was required to direct that notification of the pendency of constitutional questions be given to the Attorney General and afford the Attorney General the opportunity to intervene (Executive Law § 71; CPLR 1012[b][1], [3]; see e.g. People v. Whitehead, 46 A.D.3d 715, 848 N.Y.S.2d 657 [2007] ). On point here is Jefferds v. Ellis, 122 A.D.2d 595, 505 N.Y.S.2d 15 [1986], where it was held error for the lower court to have passed upon the constitutionality of State statutes without notice to the Attorney General, a failure which was held to preclude the appellate court from reaching the issue.
Accordingly, the order is reversed, the accusatory instrument reinstated, and the matter remitted to the Justice Court for all further proceedings thereon.
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Decided: April 24, 2009
Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Term, New York.
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FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
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