PEOPLE v. BROWN (1998)

 Defendant's conviction of burglary in the third degree (Penal Law § 140.20) is not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).  We reject the contention of defendant that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.   Upon our review of the law and the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the representation received by defendant was meaningful (see, People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400;  People v. Trait, 139 A.D.2d 937, 938, 527 N.Y.S.2d 920, lv. denied 72 N.Y.2d 867, 532 N.Y.S.2d 517, 528 N.E.2d 908;  see also, People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705, 708-709, 530 N.Y.S.2d 52, 525 N.E.2d 698).   We also reject defendant's contention that a new trial is required because the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective black juror from the jury panel constituted purposeful discrimination (see, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69).   Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by articulating facts sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenge to preclude a venire person of defendant's race (see, People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263, 267-268, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 614 N.E.2d 709;  People v. Rumph, 202 A.D.2d 1035, 1036, 609 N.Y.S.2d 719, lv. denied 83 N.Y.2d 876, 613 N.Y.S.2d 136, 635 N.E.2d 305).   In any event, in response to defendant's Batson motion, the prosecutor explained that he struck the juror because she indicated that an individual's prior criminal record would not have an impact on her judgment of that individual's credibility.   The prosecutor thereby provided a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge (see generally, People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101, 109-110, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 653 N.E.2d 1173;  People v. Boyd, 236 A.D.2d 833, 654 N.Y.S.2d 71, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 1089, 660 N.Y.S.2d 382, 682 N.E.2d 983).

 Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that his right to a fair trial was violated because he was required to wear jail attire at trial (see, People v. Owens, 251 A.D.2d 1037, 674 N.Y.S.2d 881;  People v. Grimes, 112 A.D.2d 711, 712, 492 N.Y.S.2d 198).   Finally, we conclude that defendant's sentence is neither unduly harsh nor severe.

Judgment unanimously affirmed.

MEMORANDUM: