BEEKMAN REGENT CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION v. GREATER NEW YORK MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (2007)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Judith J. Gische, J.), entered March 19, 2007, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the action as time-barred by a two-year contractual limitations period, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

 Defendant insurer conclusively established a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law by submitting documentary evidence (see CPLR 3211[a] [1] ) that the policy contains a two-year limitations period and that plaintiffs' action was commenced after the expiration of that period (see Gilbert Frank Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 966, 967, 525 N.Y.S.2d 793, 520 N.E.2d 512 [1988];  Blitman Constr. Corp. v. Insurance. Co. of N. Am., 66 N.Y.2d 820, 823, 498 N.Y.S.2d 349, 489 N.E.2d 236 [1985] ).   Plaintiffs' contention that they were unaware of the contractual limitations clause because of the length of the policy is insufficient to raise a factual issue as to the applicability of the contractual limitations period, since “an insured has an obligation to read his or her policy and is presumed to have consented to its terms” (Katz v. American Mayflower Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 14 A.D.3d 195, 198, 788 N.Y.S.2d 15 [2004], affd. 5 N.Y.3d 561, 807 N.Y.S.2d 583, 841 N.E.2d 742 [2005] ).   Defendant was under no obligation to call plaintiffs' attention to the limitations clause (Blitman, 66 N.Y.2d at 823, 498 N.Y.S.2d 349, 489 N.E.2d 236), and the insurer's participation in settlement negotiations “either before or after expiration of a limitations period contained in a policy is not, without more, sufficient to prove waiver or estoppel” (Gilbert Frank, 70 N.Y.2d at 967, 525 N.Y.S.2d 793, 520 N.E.2d 512;  see also Carnegie Hill 90th St. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 271 A.D.2d 333, 706 N.Y.S.2d 417 [2000] ).

We have considered and rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims.