LITTLE v. CITY OF SYRACUSE (1999)

 Defendant City of Syracuse (City) contends that Supreme Court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment because the action of defendant Florence Arnold in turning her vehicle left in front of the oncoming motorcycle driven by plaintiff Leo Owens was the sole proximate cause of the accident.   We disagree.  “Negligence cases by their very nature do not usually lend themselves to summary judgment, since often, even if all parties are in agreement as to the underlying facts, the very question of negligence is itself a question for jury determination” (Ugarriza v. Schmieder, 46 N.Y.2d 471, 474, 414 N.Y.S.2d 304, 386 N.E.2d 1324).   Moreover, issues of proximate cause are generally matters that are for the jury to resolve (see, Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314-315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666, rearg. denied 52 N.Y.2d 784, 436 N.Y.S.2d 622, 417 N.E.2d 1010).   Here, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the City's alleged negligence in failing to place a center line along the entire length of Peat Street and in misaligning the partial center lines on the street was not a proximate cause of the accident.

Order unanimously affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: