TIMOTHY WILLIAMS v. CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT INC CAESARS PALACE CAESARS SPORTSBOOK (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is a pro se appeal of a February 19, 2026, minute order, later entered as a written order on March 9, 2026, “denying [appellant's] motion to excuse further administrative exhaustion, reinstate jurisdiction, and proceed to jury trial on merits; and granting [respondent's] countermotion to confirm dismissal[.]” Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jennifer L. Schwartz, Judge.

Review of the notice of appeal and documents before this court reveals a jurisdictional defect. Specifically, the challenged order is not substantively appealable. This court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule.” Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013).

The motion denied in the March 9 order did not specifically request relief pursuant to NRCP 50(b), 52(b), or 59, and even if it could be construed as having done so, the motion was untimely. See id. Thus, the March 9 order is not independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(2). See NRAP 4(a)(5).

The district court entered an order dismissing appellant's action on August 5, 2025, and notice of entry was served the same day. The August 5 order appears to be the final judgment in this matter. Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) (“[A] final judgment is one that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such as attorney's fees and costs.”). To the extent, if any, appellant's notice of appeal can be construed as challenging the August 5 order, the notice of appeal is untimely. NRAP 4(a)(1); see Healy v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 103 Nev. 329, 331, 741 P.2d 432, 433 (1987) (explaining that an untimely notice of appeal fails to vest jurisdiction in this court).

The March 9 order does not qualify as a special order after final judgment because it does not affect the rights of any party incorporated in the final judgment. See Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 915, 59 P.3d 1220, 1222 (2002) (defining a special order after final judgment, and stating that “the mere fact that the order in point of time is made after a final judgment has been entered does not render it appealable”). Thus, the March 9 order is not independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(8). No statute or court rule provides for appeal of the March 9 order challenged by appellant, and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In addition, appellant appears to have abandoned this appeal because he has not filed a transcript request form or docketing statement after being directed to do so by this court on March 10, 2026, and then again on April 7, 2026. Accordingly, this court

ORDERS this appeal DISMISSED.

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.