CAMACHO v. STATE (2020)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Camacho's postconviction habeas petition was untimely because it was filed 11 years after remittitur issued on direct appeal. See NRS 34.726(1); Camacho v. State, Docket No. 49150 (Order Affirming in Part, Vacating in Part, and Remanding, July 14, 2008). Camacho's petition was also successive because he had previously filed several postconviction habeas petitions and an abuse of the writ because he asserted claims that had been raised in a prior petition. See NRS 34.810(2); Camacho v. Warden, Docket No. 63354 (Order of Affirmance, September 17, 2014); Camacho v. Warden, Docket No. 55401 (Order of Affirmance, April 6, 2011). Thus, Camacho's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

Camacho does not argue that he has good cause to excuse the procedural bars. Rather, Camacho argues that the procedural bars should be excused because he is actually innocent. Actual innocence requires Camacho to show that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of ․ new evidence,” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); see also Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001), and that he is factually innocent, see Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). Camacho did not identify any new evidence but instead disputes the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Cf. Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. 565, 576, 331 P.3d 867, 875 (2014) (distinguishing actual innocence and insufficient evidence claims). We therefore conclude that the district court correctly applied the mandatory procedural bars. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005).

Having considered Camacho's contentions and concluded that they do not warrant relief, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.