ECHO PAYMENT SYSTEMS INC PAUL NEUSTAEDTER RAY WIELER IRVIN FUNK ROBERT DYCK RYAN GUZMAN AND KEVIN PRICE v. RONALD INGRAM (2026)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

This original petition for a writ of mandamus challenges a district court's order denying a motion to dismiss real party in interest Ronald Ingram's counterclaims.

Real party in interest Ronald Ingram founded Echo Payment Systems (EPS) and 1036807 Canada Inc. d/b/a EchoTek (ET). At all relevant times, Ingram held a majority of voting shares in both ET and EPS. ET was “an investment conduit to allow Canadians to more easily invest in EPS.” The six non-corporate petitioners were investors in EPS or ET. In 2023, they ousted Ingram from both companies via proceedings that occurred in Clark County. The individual petitioners applied for summary proceedings in the Court of King's Bench in Canada, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief with regard to Ingram's management and/or ownership of ET. At the time of this appeal, the record indicates that the Canadian proceedings are ongoing.

Separately, EPS sued Ingram and other companies affiliated with Ingram in Nevada, claiming that the Ingram-affiliated companies failed to pay EPS money owed. The individual petitioners were not originally parties to the Nevada suit. Ingram answered EPS's complaint and filed 20 counterclaims against the individual petitioners regarding Ingram's ouster.¹ EPS unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the counterclaims pursuant to the first-to-file rule. EPS now petitions for a writ of mandamus compelling the district court to dismiss Ingram's counterclaims under either the first-to-file rule or international comity doctrine.

A writ of mandamus is an “extraordinary” remedy that compels a respondent to perform an act that the petitioner is legally entitled to. Heights of Summerlin, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 65, 556 P.3d 959, 962 (2024). Writ relief is appropriate only when a petitioner does not have a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” NRS 34.170. “[T]he issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition is purely discretionary with this court.” Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). We typically do not consider “writ petitions challenging district court orders denying motions to dismiss, because such petitions rarely have merit, often disrupt district court case processing, and consume an enormous amount of this court's resources.” Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second, Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558-59 (2008) (citation modified). Nevertheless, we may consider such petitions if “either (1) no factual dispute exists and the district court is obligated to dismiss an action pursuant to clear authority under a statute or rule, or (2) an important issue of law needs clarification and considerations of sound judicial economy and administration militate in favor of granting the petition.” Id. at 197-98, 179 P.3d at 559.

We decline to entertain this petition on the merits as EPS has not shown that either exception applies. First, neither the first-to-file rule nor principles of international comity mandate dismissal; application of both is within the discretion of the district court. See Mesi v. Mesi, 136 Nev. 748, 752, 478 P.3d 366, 370 (2020) (first-to-file); Lathigee v. B.C. Sec. Comm'n, 136 Nev. 670, 676, 477 P.3d 352, 357-58 (2020) (international comity). Second, EPS fails to argue how either the first-to-file rule or the international comity doctrine require clarification. Finally, EPS fails to demonstrate how entertaining this petition on the merits would promote judicial economy. EPS's argument that it will be forced to litigate this issue in two courts absent extraordinary writ relief neglects to consider that EPS caused that outcome by filing two suits in different countries.

Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.

Stiglich, J.

Cadish, J.

Lee, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We refer to the petitioners collectively as EPS from here on.