CHAO MA v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK (2019)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in an action to quiet title. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Richard Scotti, Judge. Reviewing the summary judgment de novo, Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005), we affirm.¹

In Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, 134 Nev, 270, 272-74, 417 P.3d 363, 367-68 (2018) (Christine View), this court held that 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (2012) (the Federal Foreclosure Bar) preempts NRS 116.3116 and prevents an HOA foreclosure sale from extinguishing a first deed of trust when the subject loan is owned by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (or when the FHFA is acting as conservator of a federal entity such as Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae). And in Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 133 Nev. 247, 250-51, 396 P.3d 754, 757-58 (2017), this court held that loan servicers such as respondent have standing to assert the Federal Foreclosure Bar on behalf of Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. Consistent with these decisions, the district court correctly determined that respondent had standing to assert the Federal Foreclosure Bar on Freddie Mac's behalf and that the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust because Freddie Mac owned the secured loan at the time of the sale.²

Appellant contends that he is protected as a bona fide purchaser from the Federal Foreclosure Bar's effect. But we recently held that an HOA foreclosure sale purchaser's putative status as a bona fide purchaser is inapposite when the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies because Nevada law does not require Freddie Mac to publicly record its ownership interest in the subject loan. Daisy Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 135 Nev., Adv. Op. 30, 445 P.3d 846, 849 (2019). Appellant also raises arguments challenging the sufficiency and admissibility of respondent's evidence demonstrating Freddie Mac's interest in the loan and respondent's status as the loan's servicer, but we recently addressed and rejected similar arguments with respect to similar evidence.³ Id. at 850-51. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that appellant took title to the property subject to the first deed of trust. We therefore

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.⁴

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted in this appeal.

2.   Appellant's reliance on Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass'n v. New York Community Bancorp, Inc., 132 Nev. 49, 366 P.3d 1105 (2016), is misplaced. The Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts NRS 116.3116’s superpriority provision by operation of law, Christine View, 134 Nev. at 272-74, 417 P.3d at 367-68, and no equitable balancing could overcome that preemptive effect.

3.   Appellant criticizes Dean Meyer's and Evan Grageda's declarations as being self-serving, but that does not render them or the supporting documents inadmissible. Wilson v. McRae's, Inc., 413 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Most affidavits are self-serving, as is most testimony ․”). To the extent appellant has raised arguments that were not explicitly addressed in Daisy Trust, none of those arguments convince us that the district court abused its discretion in admitting respondent's evidence. 135 Nev., Adv. Op. 30, 445 P.3d at 850 (recognizing that this court reviews a district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion).

4.   The Honorable Michael Douglas, Senior Justice, participated in the decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.